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Max Weber on Property:
An Effort in Interpretive Understanding
As Published in Volume 6, Socio-Legal Review (2010)
Laura R. Ford ∗
I. Introduction:
Property and Organized Social Relationships, in Three Phases
Throughout the academic world, renewed interest in property and “property rights” is evident.
Within certain economic quarters, the writings of Ronald Coase have been responsible for something
approaching a paradigm shift, 1 with a focus on property rights and “transaction costs” in their exchange at
the core. 2 Although discussion of property has been fundamental to political theory since its inception,
widespread application of “neo-liberal” principles in the context of international development finance –
which have emphasized the importance of stable, private property rights – has motivated political
scientists, development economists, and public policy theorists to direct increasing attention to propertyrights regimes. 3 Within legal science, property sits at the heart of continental and common-law legal
systems, as well as legal systems that these property-based systems have influenced. Within the social
sciences, recent attention to property is evident in anthropology and economic sociology. 4
∗

J.D., LL.M., M.P.A., Doctoral Candidate, Sociology, Cornell University. I wish to thank Richard Swedberg,
Martin Schroeder, and Mark Vail for helpful and encouraging comments and suggestions.
1
See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996) (1962).
2
See PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW (Terry L. Anderson & Fred McChesney eds. 2003)
(hereinafter “PROPERTY RIGHTS”); YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS,
AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE (2002); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1990); YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1997) (1989); R. H. Coase,
THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY (1981).
Some readers might question the validity of characterizing these developments as a “paradigm shift” in
Kuhn’s sense. In response to such doubts, it is worth noting that, throughout The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Kuhn repeatedly stated that paradigm shifts need not occur on a macro scale in order to be so characterized, but
rather more typically appear as regularized, small-scale changes in the basic conceptual commitments within a
community of scientific practitioners. See e.g. KUHN, supra note 1, at 6-7, 180-81. Indeed, it would not be difficult
to describe the transition to an economic “property rights” paradigm in Kuhnian terms. Such an account would
describe a crisis in the “normal science” of neoclassical economics provoked by problems of “public goods” and
“externalities,” and the increasing “recognition” that a conception of private property rights, or “ownership,”
underlies the neoclassical economics paradigm. For an exceptionally clear statement of this, see Harold Demsetz,
Ownership and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, at 282-300.
3
See, e.g., Jean Rogers, Property, Power and Growth (Center for International Private Enterprise 2003), available
at http://www.cipe.org/pdf/publications/fs/jeanrogers.pdf; HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000).
Moreover, the ascendance of “rational choice theory” perspectives in political science has led to increasing
interchange among “property rights” scholars in political science and economics. See, e.g., William H. Riker & Itai
Sened, A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights: Airport Slots, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951 (1991).
4
See Neil Fligstein & Jennifer Choo, Law and Corporate Governance, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61 (2005);
Annelise Riles, Property as Legal Knowledge: Means and Ends, 10 J. ROY. ANTHROP. INST. LAW 775 (2004);
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In the case of contemporary sociology, however, the subject of property has been generally
neglected until quite recently, as Richard Swedberg has noted. 5 Even the recent discussions of property
within economic sociology, moreover, have not focused on the sociological nature of property, but have
rather focused on its effects, viewing it in a manner generally consistent with neo-institutional economic
theory. 6 This is true despite the fact that Emile Durkheim and Max Weber both devoted considerable
attention to the nature of property in their published works. 7
The purpose of this article will be to explore Max Weber’s writings on property, in an effort to
trace the development of his thinking on the subject and to identify whether coherent sociological themes
emerge.

This is an immensely challenging task.

References to property are pervasive throughout

Weber’s work, from his dissertation to the compilation that is Economy and Society. 8 Moreover, the
subject of property goes to the heart of Weber’s multiple areas of expertise: law, economics, public
administration, and sociology. Thus the investigator is faced with Weber at the pinnacle of his precision
and subtlety. For a person educated in the 21st Century, these difficulties are compounded by the
ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS (Alain Pottage & Martha
Mundy eds. 2004); Victor Nee & Yang Cao, Path Dependent Societal Transformation: Stratification in Hybrid
Mixed Economies, 28 THEORY & SOC’Y 799 (1999); PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL
TRADITION (C.M. Hann ed. 1998); Victor Nee & Peng Lian, Sleeping With the Enemy: A Dynamic Model of
Declining Political Commitment in State Socialism, 23 THEORY & SOC’Y 253 (1994).
5
RICHARD SWEDBERG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 203 (2003); see also ALVIN GOULDNER, THE
COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 304-13 (1970). One important exception is Jens Beckert, who has recently
published work on the sociology of inheritance law, as well as a number of other property-related topics. See JENS
BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH (2008) (originally published in German as UNVERDIENTES VERMÖGEN: SOZIOLOGIE
DES ERBRECHTS (2004)); The Longue Durée of Inheritance Law: Discourses and Institutional Development in
France, Germany, and the United States, 48 ARCHIVES EUROPÉENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (2007). For a recent review
article, which reinforces the point that property has been generally neglected in contemporary sociology, while also
formulating certain prescriptions for future sociological work, see Bruce G. Carruthers & Laura Ariovich, The
Sociology of Property Rights, 30 ANN. SOC. REV. 23 (2004).
It is important to note that James Coleman’s theoretical work has generally emphasized the importance of
“resources” and “rights,” and thus may constitute a significant exception to the argument that contemporary
sociological theory has tended to ignore property. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY
(Harvard Paperback ed. 1994) (1990). Coleman’s theoretical work has been heavily influenced by rational choice
theory, especially economic theory. See id. Thus his emphasis on property is very likely a reflection of the overall
developments in economic theory that are described supra in note 2. Ronald Coase and other founders of the
“property rights” perspective in economic theory are cited liberally throughout his theoretical work, and the
paradigmatic problems of “free ridership” and “externality” are correspondingly emphasized. See id. at 27-64.
6
See, e.g., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds. 1998).
7
See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 121-70 (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 2d ed.,
1992) (1957); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (Free Press Paperback ed. 1997) (1893). The
writings of Max Weber on property will be discussed infra.
8
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., University of California Press 1978) (1968). For discussions of the compilation and its contents, see
RICHARD SWEDBERG, MAX WEBER AND THE IDEA OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 153-62, 197-203 (1998); compare
Overview of the Text of Economy and Society by the Editors of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, 1 MAX WEBER
STUDIES 104 (2000) with Hiroshi Orihara, From a Torso with a Wrong Head to Five Disjointed Body-Parts Without
a Head: A Critique of the Editorial Policy for Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/22, 3 MAX WEBER STUDIES 133 (2003).
See also infra notes 223 to 230 and accompanying text.
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challenge of understanding detailed analogies and distinctions drawn by Weber, as a late 19th-Century
thinker, among (1) his contemporary German-Prussian socio-legal framework, (2) multiple medieval
socio-legal frameworks, and (3) ancient socio-legal frameworks, particularly those of Greece and Rome.
From a purely legal (“doctrinal”) perspective, such a task seems virtually impossible, since the law in
question includes property, contract, bankruptcy, corporations, public administrative law, and family law,
as well as jurisprudential theory.
However, from his first dissertation, Weber was explicit in stating that his interest was not
primarily doctrinal (or “dogmatic,” 9 to use his terminology), nor was it historical, in the sense of merely
describing the commercial-historical developments that paralleled particular legal frameworks. 10 Thus
one cannot simply rely on legal texts or commercial-historical facts in trying to understand Weber’s
arguments. The necessity of interpreting Weber’s German, as well as his Latin and Romance legal
sources, from an English-speaking perspective further complicates matters. Such difficulties demand
caution from any interpreter, and create myriad opportunities for mistaken inferences and conclusions.
Yet, precisely for these reasons, there is much to be learned from Weber’s writings on property.
His writings spanned an enormous historical range, and took account of German jurisprudential,
economic and social-historical thought at its peak. His professors and advisors included many leading
figures in German jurisprudence, economics, and public administration, including Levin Goldschmidt, 11
Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903), 12 and August Meitzen (1822-1910). 13 Moreover, as will become

9

In German legal literature, the term “dogmatic” generally denotes the binding nature of a legally authoritative text.
See, e.g. FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMANY
34 (Tony Weir trans. 1995) (originally published as PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT, rev’d ed. 1967)
(1952).
10
See MAX WEBER, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN IM MITTELALTER, as published in MAX
WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE ZUR SOZIAL- UND WIRTSCHAFTS-GESCHICHTE 312 (1924) (hereinafter
“Handelsgesellschaften”). The definitive edition of this text has recently been published in German as part of the
overarching Max Weber Gesamtausgabe project. See MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER
HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN IM MITTELALTER (Gerhard Dilcher & Susanne Lepsius eds.) (2008). The scholarly
introductions written by the editors for each volume in the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe series are invaluable sources
for understanding the particular texts in their historical context and in relation to Weber’s other works.
11
Goldschmidt was Weber’s primary advisor and mentor in writing his first dissertation. See infra notes 18 to 29
and accompanying text.
12
According to the Nobel Foundation, which in 1902 awarded him a Nobel Prize in Literature, Theodor Mommsen
was “the greatest classical historian of the Nineteenth Century.” See The Nobel Foundation, Nobel Prizes by Year,
The
Nobel
Prize
in
Literature
1902,
available
at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1902/mommsen-bio.html. Mommsen’s most frequently cited
work is his multivolume History of Rome, a work which is still in print today. However, he is credited with
authoring or editing over 1500 works, including a number of invaluable primary sources in Roman law and social
history. His degrees were in law and history; at University of Berlin he was a member of the faculty of law. See
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576-77 (1937, Volume X).
13
Meitzen was an agrarian historian and statistician. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 302 (1937,
Volume X). He had acquired distinction through his services to the Prussian state, first in conducting an exhaustive
study of Prussian agriculture and land-taxes, then through his labors in the administration’s statistical bureau. See id.
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evident, much of contemporary property theory was prefigured in Weber’s writing. Thus he is relevant
both historically and contemporarily. For these reasons, despite the enormous challenges involved, this
article will seek to draw much-deserved attention to Weber’s work on property.
Weber’s scholarly work pertaining to property will be presented here as proceeding in three
distinct phases: (1) the legal phase of his first dissertation, in which he first defined property in sociorelational terms and articulated a number of themes to which he would return in later work; (2) the
economic-historical phase, in which he articulated a narrative of fundamental historical change in
proprietary social relationships, bringing into bold relief the character of agrarian property and the
contrasting character of commercial property; and (3) the sociological phase, in which Weber drew on the
two prior phases to articulate a sociological theory of property. The notion that Weber’s property-related
work proceeded in three clearly-defined phases is distortive; legal, historical, economic, and social
elements are present from the beginning of his work, and blended throughout his work in interesting ways.
Nevertheless, the distortion does enable a developmental understanding of the ways that Weber
conceptualized and analyzed property.
This developmental image of Weber’s property-related scholarly work reveals the extent to which
his finally-developed, sociological theory of property built on insights from his legal and economichistorical phases. As the reader will see, Weber presented property as a phenomenon dependent on
organized social relationships that are to some extent closed to outside participants. This conception was
legally and historically articulated in the first dissertation. In Economy and Society, this conception was
sociologically formulated and systematically connected to additional important concepts, particularly that
of “Order.” A developmental presentation reveals the extent to which Weber’s property-related concepts
were systematically and meticulously constructed over the course of his lifetime. The fact that he could
return to insights from his early scholarship in articulating his sociological theory of property
demonstrates the strength of the legal and economic-historical foundation he built. It is to that foundation
that we now turn.

II. The Legal Phase: The First Dissertation.
Property and Organized Social Relationships
Translated literally, Weber’s first dissertation has a descriptive, albeit complex, title:
“Development of the Solidary-Liability-Principle and the Separate-Property-Fund of the Public
Mercantile-Association from the Household-and-Craft-Industry-Communities in the Italian Cities”

His History, Theory, and Technique of Statistics (1891) has been translated by Roland P. Falkner and is currently
available in a paperback reprint edition (BiblioLife). See also infra note 107.
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(hereinafter the “Dissertation”). 14 Weber successfully defended the Dissertation in 1889, 15 and in the
same year published it as the third chapter in a larger work, 16 which he titled On the History of
Mercantile-Associations in the Middle Ages (hereinafter “The History of Mercantile-Associations”). 17
Weber’s dissertation chair (Doktorvater), a professor whose seminar had inspired him to begin his
research two years previously, was Levin Goldschmidt, a renowned commercial law scholar. 18 The
significance of this fact may be more fully appreciated once Goldschmidt’s scholarship is approached
from a contemporary U.S. legal perspective.
Since the 1950’s, U.S. commercial law has been dominated by the Uniform Commercial Code
(referred to as the “UCC”). One of the core principles enshrined in the UCC – a principle that U.S. firstyear law students learn as a matter of sacred doctrine – is deference to “trade usages” (i.e. commercial
customs), 19 which are used to interpret the language of commercial agreements and to fill gaps in those
agreements. 20 Although the UCC’s final text is a result of legislative compromise, its foundational
principles (and much of its text) were provided by Karl Llewellyn, a German-American law professor
with a deep understanding of Continental-European legal thought. 21 As James Whitman has persuasively
argued, Llewellyn’s abiding respect for “trade usages” was likely influenced by Levin Goldschmidt, who
as a participant in the drafting of the 1861 German Commercial Code (Deutsche Handels-Gesetzbuch)
had argued that “[u]nconditional free play for custom is a cardinal point of view for the desired new
phase of commercial law.” 22
14

Entwickelung des Solidarhaftprinzips und des Sondervermögens der offenen Handelsgesellschaft aus den
Haushalts- und Gewerbegemeinschaften in den italienischen Städten. See DIRK KÄSLER, MAX WEBER: AN
INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK 243 (Philippa Hurd trans. 1988) (originally published as EINFÜHRUNG IN
DAS STUDIUM MAX WEBERS 1979).
15
See LUTZ KÄLBER, THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 9-10 (2003); KÄSLER,
supra note 14, at 6.
16
See KÄLBER, supra note 15, at 9-10.
17
See supra note 10.
18
See KÄLBER, supra note 15, at 6-10.
19
See, e.g., UCC § 1-102(2)(b) (“Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are…to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.”); § 1-205(2) (“A usage of
trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”).
20
See, e.g., UCC § 1-201(3) (“Agreement” means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade…”); § 1-205(3) (“A course of
dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they
are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.”).
21
See James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L. J. 156, 166-70 (1987); Shael Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations
on the Contribution of Continental Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1125, 1130-31
(1982).
22
Whitman, supra note 21, at 165 (quoting and translating LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, KRITIK DES ENTWURFS EINES
HANDELSGESETZBUCHS, 4 KRITISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT F.D. GESAMMTE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 113 (1857)) (emphasis
in original). Goldschmidt’s influence on Llewellyn’s legal thought is seen in Llewellyn’s approving quotation and
gloss on Goldschmidt in The Common Law Tradition. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 122
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To Goldschmidt, commercial custom was an outgrowth and manifestation of the collective will of
the people (Volk). 23 The beneficent law-giver was the man who enabled the “immanent,” “natural law,”
emergent from the will of the Volk and the particular fact-pattern, to be applied. 24 The beauty of the “law
merchant” – lex mercatoria – was its relative independence from rationalistic, Roman-law influenced
legal systems, 25 preeminent cases of which are the Prussian Code (1761) and the French Civil Code
(1804). His passionate interest in the law merchant and its relationship to Volk customs, led Goldschmidt
to dedicate a lifetime of study to “Handelsrecht,” which may be translated as “Commercial Law” or
“Mercantile Law.” 26 By 1891, this lifetime study had culminated in a Universal History of Mercantile
Law. 27 In the language often used to categorize 19th Century German legal scholars, Goldschmidt is
considered a “Germanist,” albeit one who acknowledged a greater influence by Roman law on local (i.e.
German) mercantile customs than some of his Germanist counterparts. 28 His vision of the law merchant
as a body of law emergent from mercantile custom remains influential to this day. 29

A. The Question: The Origin(s) of Modern Commercial Organization Forms,
and their Connection to Property-Relationship Structures
Viewed in this light, Weber’s decision to write his Dissertation under Goldschmidt takes on
greater significance, and the substance of that study becomes more comprehensible. In the introduction to
The History of Mercantile-Associations, Weber declared his work to be an investigation into medieval
south-European mercantile customs (Handelsgebrauch, trade usages), based on an examination of
available original source-materials. 30 Specifically, Weber stated that he was interested in whether
medieval south-European mercantile customs resulted in completely new legal concepts – through general
acceptance and development into customary law – or whether such customs were met by transformed, but

(1960). Channeled through Llewellyn, Goldschmidt’s legacy has survived in U.S. commercial law. See WHITMAN,
supra note 21; Arthur L. Corbin, A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 71 Yale L.J. 805, at 811-12 (1962). Somewhat
ironically, however, Goldschmidt’s survival is at the cost of a mistaken attribution. See WHITMAN, supra note 21, at
158 n.16. Llewellyn mistakenly attributed his quote, not to Goldschmidt’s great life’s-work, the Handbook of
Commercial Law (see infra note 24) from whence the quote actually comes, but rather to a less famous work. See id.
23
See id.
24
See LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDELSRECHTS 302 (3d ed. 1875) (1864).
25
See WHITMAN, supra note 21, at 162-66.
26
See MARY ELIZABETH BASILE ET AL., LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY
TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (Introduction) 163-64 (1998).
27
See LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, UNIVERSALGESCHICHTE DES HANDELSRECHTS (1891); BASILE ET AL, supra note 26, at
164 n.7.
28
See WHITMAN, supra note 21, at 159-65 & n.55; WIEACKER, supra note 9, at 300-40, 366-67.
29
See Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685 (2006); see also supra note 22.
30
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 312-13.
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previously existent, legal institutions. 31 In other words, consistent with the interests of his dissertation
chair (Goldschmidt), Weber had undertaken a study of the relationship among mercantile customs, legal
concepts and legal institutions in medieval south-Europe, specifically Italy and Spain.

He was

particularly interested in a subset relationship between custom and law: the organization of persons for
economic production and commercial activity, and its consequences for property law (Vermögensrecht).
Consistent with the categories of German commercial law, embodied less than three decades
previously (1861) in the German Commercial Code, 32 Weber was interested in the origins of two types of
commercial organization: (1) the Public Mercantile-Association (offene Handelsgesellschaft) and (2) the
Commenda-Association (Kommanditgesellschaft). 33 Moreover, he was interested in the relationship
between these types and an ancient Roman type of commercial organization, the societas. 34

In

distinguishing among these three types of commercial organization, his primary focus was on the
distinctive property-relationships (Vermögensbeziehungen) – including claims and obligations with
respect to non-associates, particularly creditors – that were characteristic of these forms. 35 In fact, as will
be shown, Weber viewed these distinctive property-relationship structures as constitutive of the particular
organizational forms.
Weber’s historical point of departure was the societas of Roman law. 36 According to the Roman
jurists, 37 this association was essentially contractual in nature: it created a relationship of reciprocal
31

See id. at 312.
See DAS ALLGEMEINE DEUTSCHE HANDELS-GESETZBUCH MIT ERLÄUTERUNGEN NACH DEN MATERIALIEN UND
BENUTZUNG DER SÄMMTLICHEN VORARBEITEN VON BORNEMANN, BALDECK, STROHN UND BÜRGERS 78-9, 117
(Berlin 1862) (hereinafter “1861 HGB”).
33
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 313-44. To facilitate ready comparison with AngloU.S. legal categories for commercial organization, these are often (and with variations) translated as “General
Commercial Partnership” and “Limited Partnership,” respectively. See, e.g. NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE,
GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 492-98 (3d ed. 2002) (1993); GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH (Charles E. Stewart trans. 2001). In the context of Weber’s 19th Century historical analysis,
however, such translations may disguise more than they reveal. Under contemporary Anglo-American law,
partnerships are sharply contrasted with corporations, the distinguishing features of the latter being the corporation’s
separate legal “personality” and shareholders’ limited liability. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 2003) (1995). It is generally agreed that the precursor to the modern Anglo-American
corporation is the joint stock corporation, but the origins of the joint stock corporation have been a matter of debate
among legal historians. See M. Schmitthof, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 74 (1939).
Nevertheless, certain historians have taken the position that “public companies” and “commenda” (analogues to
offene Handelsgesellschaft and Kommanditgesellschaft) were intermediate stages between ancient Roman forms of
business enterprise and the joint stock corporation, prefiguring in certain respects modern forms of business
enterprise, including the corporation. See id, particularly at 79-92. To use the term “partnership” in translating
“Gesellschaft” may disguise the fact that Weber was making a similarly broad kind of argument.
34
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 313-44.
35
See id. at 314-19, 335-86.
36
See id. at 313-21.
37
In the context of a discussion of Roman law, the term “jurist” designates a learned interpreter and expounder of
the law, whose opinions (responsa) were taken to be authoritative expressions of Roman civil law after the time of
Caesar Augustus (Octavian). See THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN I.2 (rev’d English ed., Alan Watson ed., 1998) (1985)
(translation based on the Latin text of Theodor Mommsen, 1868) (Latin text available at The Roman Law Library,
32
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obligations (obligationes, from ob + ligare, meaning to tie together, to unite) among the associates, which
were enforceable between them, but virtually irrelevant as far as third parties were concerned. 38 The
association endured for as long the original associates remained alive and retained a shared understanding,
but might have a much shorter duration if its purpose was limited or if the associates’ shared
understanding disappeared. 39 For purposes of convenience, the associates might each put money into a
common fund, creating a kind of “common property” (res (arca) communis). 40 However, from the
http://webu2.upmf-grenoble.fr/Haiti/Cours/Ak/index.htm) (533) (hereinafter “The Digest”); THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN I.2.8 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans. 1987) (including the Latin text of Paul Krüger, 1867, upon
which the translation is based) (533) (hereinafter “The Institutes of Justinian”); THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS I.2 (W.M.
Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans. 1988) (including the revised Latin text of E. Seckel & B. Kübler, 1935 (1903) upon
which the translation is based) (~160-179) (hereinafter “The Institutes of Gaius”). See also ANDREW BORKOWSKI,
TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 34-8, 43-52 (2d ed. 1997) (1994).
38
The societas was an Obligation created by shared understanding (consensus, agreement). See THE INSTITUTES
OF JUSTINIAN at III.22; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at III.135. Roman jurists divided Roman law into three
categories: the law of Persons (Personae), the law of Things (Res), and the law of Actions (Actiones). See THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 37, at I.2.12; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 37, at I.8. The law of
Actions was roughly analogous to modern procedural law, and concerned the methods for pursuing a claim. See
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at IV.6.1; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at IV.1-IV.4. The law of Persons addressed the
social status of individuals, a primary division being between slaves and free men. See THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN at I.3; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at I.9. The law of Things related to corporeal (having a physical body,
i.e. tangible) and incorporeal (intangible) things, and divided those things into such as were capable of being under
the proprietary control of a paterfamilias (patrimonium) and such as were beyond such capacity (extra patrimonium).
See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at II.1-II.2; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at II.1-II.14.
The law of Obligations was a subcategory of the law of Things. See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at II.2;
THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at II.12-II.14. More specifically, Obligations were viewed as one of several incorporeal
Things whose essence lay in their constitution by abstract right (ius, including the law/right of all peoples, ius
gentium) rather than by physical existence. See id. Obligations were considered to arise either from delict (i.e.
wrong to another person, analogous to the “tort” of Anglo-American law) or from contract (i.e. the conclusion of
business arrangements, contractus). See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at III.13; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at III.88.
Obligations arising from contract could be created by conduct, by spoken words, by written documents, or by a
shared understanding (consensus). See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at III.13; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at III.89.
Actions to enforce Obligations were considered to exist between persons (in personas), rather than pertaining
directly to a thing, unlike actions relating directly to property (in rem), which included certain incorporeal things
related to landed property (e.g. rights of way). See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at IV.6.1; THE INSTITUTES OF
GAIUS at IV.1-IV.4.
Although it may be obvious from their proximity and similar appearance, it is worth noting that the English
word “association” is derived from the Latin “societas,” which in turn derives from “socius.” See THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 842 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966). The Latin verb sociare means to unite, to share,
or to “associate.” See, e.g., THE NEW COLLEGE LATIN & ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed., John C. Traupman ed.,
1995) (1966). In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, the scope of societas expanded from being merely a
designation of temporally limited associations for specific purposes to a designation of entire human communities.
See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 842 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966). Thus was born the modern
English sense of “society.” See id. Otto Gierke’s Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht provocatively connects these
cultural developments to the emergence of the modern concept of the “state,” as can be seen from English
translations provided by Frederick William Maitland and Ernest Barker. See NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF
SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800 (Ernest Barker trans. 1950); POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederick William
Maitland trans. 1913) (reprints available from The Lawbook Exchange).
39
See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at III.25.4-III.25.5; THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 17.2.4-17.2.5; THE
INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at III.151-III.152. Note that by the Sixth Century, the associates could agree that the
association would endure beyond their individual lives. See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at III.25.4-III.25.5.
40
See, e.g., THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 17.2.14.
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perspective of third persons, neither the association nor its common fund had any real existence or legal
significance. Thus, for example, if in the course of business conducted on behalf of the association, an
associate entered into an agreement with someone outside the association, but failed to fulfill his
obligations under the agreement, a legal action would be brought against him individually, not his
associates or the association as a whole. If the legal action was successful, the associate might bring an
action against his other associates to be reimbursed for his expenses. 41 Thus, the entire legal significance
of the societas was in the legal ties formed among the contracting associates, not in the associates’
relationships with third parties. 42
However, the situation was completely different in the case of Weber’s contemporary Public
Mercantile-Association (offene Handelsgesellschaft).

In this case the associates might all be sued

together for action taken by one single associate, or the association itself might be sued under its
registered trade-name (Firma). 43 The associates were solidarily liable for the association’s obligations,
meaning they were each obligated for the entire amount of any such obligation (regardless of whether
they themselves were responsible for creating it), and could be forced to pay the entire amount if sued on
the obligation (e.g. by a creditor). 44 This solidary liability was connected with the starkest difference
between the Public Mercantile-Association and the societas: the former could acquire legal rights –
including ownership (Eigentum) – and create obligations in its own name, whereas the latter could not. 45
In the case of the Public Mercantile-Association, the “common fund” was the association’s property,
separate and apart from the associates’ individual contributions, whereas in the case of the societas the
common fund was simply the aggregated funds of the contributing associates. 46
In Weber’s view, the essential differences between the societas of Roman law and the Public
Mercantile-Association lay in the solidary liability and the association’s separate property, which were
present in the case of the latter but not in the case of the former. 47 These distinctions were based on
41

For a concise discussion of the Roman law principles pertaining to societas (translated as “partnership”), see
BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 291-95.
42
For Weber’s thorough discussion of the societates’ legal implications, see WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN,
supra note 10, at 314-15. See also Lutz Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 54.
43
See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at II.111-II.112. For an English translation of the 1900 Commercial Code (which
is relatively similar in the relevant passages), see THE GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE (1900) §§ 124, 128 (A.F.
Schuster trans. 1911) (hereinafter “1900 English HGB”).
44
See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at II.112. See also 1900 English HGB, supra note 43, at § 128 (translating
“solidarisch” as “jointly and severally”). The Anglo-American principle of “joint and several liability” is similar.
For a general discussion of Roman, French and Louisiana solidary liability principles, compared with AngloAmerican joint and several liability, see Harry Cohen, Comment, Solidary Obligations, 25 TUL. L. REV. 217 (1951).
Under the principle of solidarity, if one associate paid the entire amount of an obligation, he or she could seek
recompense from the other associates. See id. at 225-26.
45
See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at II.111. See also 1900 English HGB, supra note 43, at § 124.
46
For Weber’s much more thorough discussion of these differences, see WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra
note 10, at 315-17. See also Lutz Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 55-6.
47
WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 318.
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differences in (1) the corresponding rights and obligations of associates vis-à-vis one another and third
parties, and (2) the corresponding rights and obligations of associates and third parties vis-à-vis the
association’s common property. Stated even more simply, the essential differences between the societas
and the Public Mercantile-Association lay in their distinctive property-relations, i.e. the socio-legal ties
among associates, third parties, and the association’s property. However, Weber was willing to simplify
this even further, by defining property itself in socio-relational terms:

Insofar as one now intends to call “property” a complex of rights, which all serve a
particular purpose, which are uniformly regulated in a particular organized form, and
upon which rest particular encumbrances – and the authoritativeness of this definition is
subject to no reasonable doubt – then the entirety of the legal relations previously
described approaches this character. 48
Thus one may characterize the differences between forms of organization in terms of distinctive propertyrelations, which themselves may be viewed as distinctive complexes of rights and obligations among
associates and third parties, all with reference to a particular object (in this case, the common fund).
Where there is an object of property, a natural linguistic association – embedded with enormous
power into Roman law (as well as philosophy) by medieval scholars – causes one to look for a subject.
To put this in somewhat contemporary 21st Century terms, if there is a thing over which rights can be
exercised, there must be an entity (a “Subject”) capable of exercising those rights. In terms of legal
doctrine, this raises the question of “legal personality,” which is essentially a question of whether the law
recognizes an entity as capable of bearing rights and obligations.49 As a matter of formal legal doctrine,
the Public Mercantile-Association of Weber’s day was not considered to be a legal person; this remains
true today. 50 However, Weber was interested in an earlier period, before the joint-stock corporations
presaging the modern business corporation (today’s proto-typical legal person) had emerged. 51
In fact, Weber was interested in the medieval emergence of the idea of “personality,” as applied
to mercantile associations. 52 Although the notion of corporate (legal) personality itself was relatively old,
even under Roman law, it had been most clearly conceived as applying to entities that 21st Century minds

48

Id. at 317.
For a thorough discussion of legal personality, its conceptual emergence and its extension to various corporate
entities (including cities) under Roman law, see P.W. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (Rothman
Reprints 1971) (1938). For an excellent discussion of the Anglo-American corporation’s institutional history,
focused in part on the emergence of legal personality, see Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business
Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 149 (1888).
50
See FOSTER & SULE, supra note 33, at 492-93, 495. Nevertheless, the contemporary law recognizes that the
association’s ability to acquire property and otherwise do business under its trade-name (Firma) does confer a kind
of partial legal personality. See id.
51
See generally WILLISTON, supra note 49. See also SCHMITTHOF, supra note 33.
52
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 317-18.
49

Page 10 of 54

would tend to imbue with a public or semi-public character: cities and towns (civitates, municipia),
colonies (colonia), priestly bodies (sodalitates), and guild-like craft-worker clubs that provided meals and
funding for certain needs, particularly funerary needs (collegia). 53 Following the rise of Christianity, the
notion of corporate personality was extended to the Church, as well as to certain other charitable and
monastic organizations. 54 However, except with respect to associations of tax-collectors (societates
publicanorum/vectigalium), corporate personality never appears to have been broadly extended to the
societates by Roman jurists, nor to specifically commercial enterprises, although limited, exceptional
cases may be ambiguously identifiable. 55
In all of the cases where corporate personality was deemed to extend to organizations, the
endowment of this corporate personality was primarily significant in its implications for propertyrelations, for an entity with legal personality was an entity with the capacity to acquire distinct rights and
obligations vis-à-vis property in its own name. 56 For Weber, then, the emergence of mercantile
associations’ quasi-personality paralleled the emergence of their distinctive property-relations. 57 And,
based on his review of the south-European sources, he believed this emergence began with a simple
mental and verbal “short-hand” method (eine Art praktischer Breviloquenz) of referring to these
distinctive property-relations under the trade-name (Firma) of the association. 58 Thus, even if the
mercantile associations never acquired legal personality as a matter of formal doctrine, they acquired it as
a matter of customary development, which in turn emerged out of a cultural (ideational and linguistic)
development. 59
Based on his review of late-Roman (Sixth Century A.D.) legal sources, Weber saw no evidence
of a shift toward the distinctive property-relations (i.e. solidary liability, separate associational property)
and corollary quasi-corporate personality that characterized the Public Mercantile-Association of his own
day. 60 Thus, the answer to his initial binary query – whether medieval south-European mercantile
customs resulted in completely new legal concepts, through general acceptance and development into
customary law, or whether such customs were met by transformed, but previously existent, legal
institutions – was negative for the latter, and therefore positive for the former. 61
53

See generally DUFF, supra note 49.
See id. at 168-203.
55
See id. at 141-51, 159-61. As Weber noted, the Roman-law category of societas applied broadly to include
associations with multiple purposes; associations with commercial purposes were only one large subset of societates.
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 314. See also THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 17.2;
BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 291.
56
See generally DUFF, supra note 49.
57
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 317-18.
58
See id.
59
See id.
60
See id. at 319-21.
61
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
54
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To put his investigation into contemporary social-scientific terms, Weber was using late-Roman
legal sources to perform something analogous to a narrowly-specified cultural investigation, attempting to
locate within legal texts evidence of an ideational shift toward viewing the societates as quasi-corporate
entities, viewing the common fund as the societas’ separate property, or viewing the associates as
solidarily liable. 62 Seeing no evidence of this ideational shift in the legal texts, Weber concluded that it
cannot have taken place through gradual modification of established late-Roman legal institutions, but
must instead have emerged independently out of mercantile custom. 63 The remainder of The History of
Mercantile Associations, including the entirety of the Dissertation, was focused on identifying the precise
origins and causes of this ideational (i.e. cultural) and customary shift.
Why was Weber able to answer this question so definitely simply from an analysis of (a very
few) Sixth-Century Byzantine legal sources, 64 and then to make what appears to be a radical shift to
south-European medieval sources? In order to understand why Weber believed such conclusions were
defensible it is necessary to briefly examine early-medieval European socio-legal developments.
It is generally agreed that, during the period of “Late Antiquity” (depending upon how one
classifies, roughly the third through seventh centuries A.D.), transformations of broad-ranging social
significance occurred throughout areas that had been administered under Roman power. 65 On the
European continent, these transformations manifested themselves, among other ways, in altered sociolegal structures and institutions. As Germanic “barbarians” exercised increasing administrative power,
they tended to narrow the application of Roman law to Roman citizens, while permitting native law to be
applied to Germanic peoples. These peoples had gained literacy through their encounter with Roman
culture, but had originally maintained an oral culture; thus their native law was oral and customary, rather
than written. In narrowing the application of written Roman law, and in occasionally committing native
“Germanic” law to writing, the Germanic administrators, whether they intended to or not, brought about
the demise of Roman law. Even the Emperor Justinian’s magnificent Roman law codification of the
Sixth Century (the Code of Justinian), 66 to which Weber refers, had a very minimal European impact at
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The idea that legal doctrine can be a topic of study for ethnographers, and that legal texts can serve as sources in
such studies, has been recently defended by anthropologists and science studies scholars. See Annelise Riles,
Property as Legal Knowledge: Means and Ends, 10 J. ROY. ANTHROP. INST. 775, 777-78, 791n.2 (2004). See also
Mark Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 91 (2003).
63
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 319-21.
64
All Weber’s sources were from The Digest (Constantinople, 533 A.D.) except for the statute (lex) of the Roman
(Latin) colony of Malaca, site of present-day Málaga, Spain. See id. at 320. See also supra note 37.
65
This paragraph represents a distillation of what the author believes to be current scholarly consensus. Exemplary
sources for the author’s beliefs include RANDALL LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY: A CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (2009); PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (1999); MANLIO BELLOMO, THE
COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE (1995); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW
(1988); WIEACKER, supra note 9.
66
See THE DIGEST, supra note 37; THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 37.
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the time of its promulgation. For Europe, the social force of that Code would be held in check for another
six centuries.
Because the period of “Roman law” is viewed by legal scholars as ending gloriously with
Justinian’s Sixth-Century Code, Weber was able to treat the lack of evidence in that Code as decisive for
Roman law. Having failed to find evidence of the ideational shift in perspective (regarding the societates)
that he was looking for in the Code, he was able to conclude that it never occurred in Roman law.
Because historically the shift away from written Roman law meant a shift toward unwritten customary
law – with brief interludes of written law amalgamating Roman and Germanic elements emergent from
custom – a conclusion that the ideational shift didn’t manifest itself in written Roman law was tantamount
to a conclusion that it must have occurred through custom. Weber did not rely on this argument, however.
Instead, he turned to the available sources in order to find empirical evidence of shifting south-European
mercantile customs. These sources were the written south-European laws and mercantile documents
(primarily contracts, which were typically prepared by trained notaries) of Late Antiquity and the
subsequent “Middle Ages.”
Based on his examination of these materials, Weber concluded that the south-European propertyrelations characteristic of the associational “firm” (the analog to the Public Mercantile-Association of his
day) emerged out of the “household” (Haushalt) and “craft-industry” (Handwerk, Gewerbe) productive
communities (Gemeinschaften, Genossen), rather than the medieval maritime successors to the Roman
societates: the commenda, the societates maris, and the societates terrae. 67

Within the ancient

Mediterranean and Mesopotamian world, the household and the craft-industry “guilds” were
fundamentally-important socio-economic institutions. 68 For Weber, the characteristic property-relations
of these productive communities were necessarily those which could give rise to the property-relations
characteristic of the Public Mercantile-Association: associational (i.e. communal, joint) property and
solidary liability. 69 It was precisely this conclusion that Weber’s Dissertation defended, and that
constituted the heart of his History of Mercantile-Associations.

67

See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 323-86; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
63-125.
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See A. LEO OPPENHEIM, ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 75-83 (rev’d ed. 1977) (1964); ALISON BURFORD, CRAFTSMEN
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IN GREEK AND ROMAN SOCIETY 159-64 (1972); DUFF, supra note 49, at 103 et seq.
institutional history, it is the Greek word for household (oikos) from whence the English “economics” derives. See
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 300 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966). See also Richard Swedberg, The
Economy as a Material Household: Economic Theorizing From Xenophon to Home Economics and Beyond, in
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SCOTT MEIKLE, ARISTOTLE’S ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1995).
69
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 344-86; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
85-125.
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B. The Answer: Medieval Household and Guild Property-Relational Structures,
as Interpreted by Jurists
In Weber’s view, the physical and legal limitations placed on inheritance by sons of a father’s
estate, particularly his real property (primarily land and buildings), must necessarily have resulted in some
form of communal property. 70 Whenever a male head-of-household (Latin paterfamilias, German
Familienvater, Hausvater) died leaving more than one male heir, the question to be decided was whether
the family estate would be divided between the heirs or whether the sons and their families would remain
together as part of the household without dividing it. In the case of real property, unless additional land
was acquired, division over the course of several generations naturally reduced the property to small plots.
At some point those plots would become too small to sustain even a single family. Because land was
expensive and difficult to acquire, and because it was often impossible to expand city property due to
enclosure by walls, male heirs would often choose to remain, together with their families, as part of the
father’s household. Such households, then, might include several generations of male heirs, their wives
and children, and their domestic servants. The household property, rather than being divided among the
males, was controlled by the Hausvater for the benefit of the household.
This property-relational structure, with a male head-of-household regarded as the sole “owner” of
household property, with obligations to administer that property for the benefit of all extended-household
members, is ancient and archetypal, at least in Indo-European cultures. It is broadly attested in both
Greek and Roman law, 71 and its residue remained through Weber’s time into our own. However, by the
middle ages certain limits to this absolute father-power were developing: male heirs were empowered
both to use and to encumber the household property in unlimited amounts. 72 On the other hand, any
property that they acquired became part of the household property. 73 Thus, as an internal matter of the
household, all property was regarded as common, administered primarily by the Hausvater, but to an
increasing degree by the sons and brothers as well. 74
In the eyes of the legal theorists, the household was a productive community in which the results
of productive labor were shared. 75 In a somewhat euphemistic phraseology, from whence we see the
origins of the Anglo-French “company,” the household members were said to stand as one with respect to
70

See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 344-47; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
85-8.
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See infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text.
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See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 345-46; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
86-7.
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See id.
74
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 345-49; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
86-9.
75
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88-9.
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the bread and wine (stare ad unum panem et vinum). 76 This cultural and juristic perspective was not
limited to the household, however, but also extended to the craft-industry guilds, which produced the
goods that enriched so many medieval cities. 77 The common perspective was possible because the
medieval jurists didn’t view actual kinship as an essential element in constituting a household
community; in fact, as has already been mentioned, such households included many non-kin, such as
wives and servants. 78 Thus, because the property-relations among craft-workers were essentially the
same as those of members within a household, the jurists regarded them as constituting the same basic
type of productive community. 79
With respect to property-relations within these productive communities, the essential change
occurred when individual members came to be regarded as having an individual “share” in the common
property. 80 This occurred for households because of a few limited cases in which family members,
including daughters, were viewed as having property that either never became part of the household, or as
individually due a portion of the household’s property. 81 Although these were very limited exceptions to
the basic principle of common property, their existence necessitated an accounting for the household
property in terms of individual accounts or “shares.” 82 As soon as individual accounts were created for
the household’s property, Weber argued, the tendency to view acquired property and debts as individual
rather than communal became much greater. 83 The extent to which this tendency was followed differed
between northern and southern Italy, according to Weber, and it was the limitation of this tendency, the
maintenance of strong communal property principles, that facilitated the development of the “firm” in the
Lombard north. 84 This limitation was necessary in order to enable the concept of “associational
property,” which was one essential element of the Public Mercantile-Association.
The other essential element of the Public Mercantile-Association, solidary liability, also emerged
out of the household, according to Weber, as a result of its primordial links to kinship liability.85 Such
kinship liability systems have recurrently formed the precursors to formal legal systems, and stories of
their brutality are used by legal theorists to evidence the need for established legal systems. Over time,
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limitations on this collective responsibility for wrongs (delicts) committed by family-members came to be
imposed, but with the growth of household commercial activity the concept was nevertheless extended to
include an analogous situation: the collective responsibility to pay a creditor harmed by a debtor’s
inability to pay his debt. 86 Thus, although the legal system eliminated many aspects of familial “joint
liability” in the interests of public stability, the residue that remained became particularized to
commercial matters, forming the core of a productive community’s “solidary liability.” 87
The power of this solidary liability lay in its ability to meld a productive community of property
into a personal community: to satisfy an associate’s unpaid debt, a creditor could either take action
against the associational property (an in rem proceeding) or he could take action against the associates
personally, demanding that they satisfy the obligation from whatever property they might happen to
possess, some of which might be deemed separate and apart from the association’s common property (an
in personam proceeding). 88 This enabled associations to operate on the basis of increasing amounts of
debt, and thereby permitted the scale of household and guild commerce to increase dramatically, since
creditors were given greater security for their loans, in the form of personal guarantees on top of the
common associational property that could be seized. 89
On the other hand, as the commercial scale of business activity expanded, and as workshops and
factories became increasingly separated from domestic household activities, such unlimited solidary
liability was increasingly perceived as unjust in cases where the liability arose out of activities unrelated
to the common commercial purposes. 90 So over time the city statutes regulating household and guild
activities tended to limit solidary liability to obligations undertaken in relation to those common business
purposes. 91 In order to clearly differentiate obligations undertaken on behalf of the business from those
undertaken for other, more personal purposes, associates entered into obligations under the trade-name of
the commercial enterprise, the Firma. 92 Hence arose that “short-hand” method (die Art praktischer
Breviloquenz) of referring to the association’s property-relations under the name of the “firm,” which
Weber viewed as the customary origin of corporate personality. 93

86

See id.
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 356-74; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
96-113.
88
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 357-74; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
98-113.
89
See id.
90
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 373-81; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
113-21.
91
See id.
92
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 381-83; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
121-23.
93
See id.; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. Striking manifestations of this “short-hand” method, as
picked up by U.S. jurists, can be seen in several early Pennsylvania decisions compiled, together with the first
87

Page 16 of 54

In Weber’s view, these south-European medieval processes resulted in the creation of two
associational “types,” characterized by their distinctive property-relations.

94

The first, which

corresponded to the Commenda-association of his day, emerged directly out of the Roman societas and
manifested itself in the medieval south-European commenda, societates maris, and societates terrae. 95
The second, in which he was primarily interested, corresponded to the Public Mercantile-Association of
his day.
Extrapolating slightly, it would seem that the development of this second type was more
interesting to Weber because its development was more complex and had greater significance for modern
capitalism, being in many ways the precursor to the modern business corporation. What emerges most
clearly from Weber’s text, however, is his deep interest in the complex interaction among (1) mercantile
custom and material reality, (2) legal practice and regulation, and (3) juristic philosophy
(jurisprudence). 96 The picture that Weber paints is one in which these three forces operated together, to a
certain extent according to their own independent logics but also in constant interactional tension, shaping
certain ideational and cultural developments that were critical to the emergence of the modern business
organization, or “firm.”
In Weber’s view, the complexity of interaction between commercial law and economic reality
was demonstrated by the fact that the Public Mercantile-Association did not develop out of the entities
that first continued the provision of commercial goods and services following the demise of the Western
Roman Empire: the medieval societates and commenda. Rather, the Public Mercantile-Association’s
defining property-relations developed from areas of the economy that were seemingly quite distant from
mercantile exchange: the household community and craft-industry guild.

As these productive

communities increasingly engaged in large-scale commercial activity and mercantile exchange, the
medieval jurists trained in Roman law struggled to incorporate them into a system that formally had no
place for them. In the end, they placed their reliance on the very thing that the associational members
relied on to delineate their solidary personal liability: operation under the “firm’s” trade name. 97 In such
cases the jurists were able to analogize the commercial associations to the (non-mercantile) corporations
known to Roman law, and to determine the implications of their activities according to established

United States Supreme Court opinions, by A.J. Dallas. See, e.g., Tillier v. Whitehead, 1 U.S. (Dallas) 269 (Penn.
1788); Musgrove v. Gibbs, 1 U.S. (Dallas) 216 (Penn. 1787).
94
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 427; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
169.
95
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 323-44, 386-428; Kälber’s English translation, supra
note 15, at 63-83, 127-71.
96
See especially WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 321-22, 383-86, 427-40; Kälber’s English
translation, supra note 15 at 60-61, 123-25, 169-81.
97
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 427-40; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at
169-80.
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jurisprudential principles. By bringing corporate personality and its characteristic property-relations
together with mercantile and commercial activity, the medieval jurists laid the jurisprudential foundations
necessary to legally conceptualize commercial corporations, which would become so vital to modern
capitalism.

C. Significance of Weber’s Dissertation for a Sociological Theory of Property

In investigating the origins of modern, commercial associational forms (Gesellschaften), and in
attributing those origins to medieval communal forms (Gemeinschaften), Weber articulated his own
version of the transition from community to contractual association that became archetypal for early
sociology through the work of Ferdinand Tönnies, 98 and that continues to resonate in contemporary
sociology. 99 That he did so by means of a sophisticated legal and cultural analysis, investigating an
original hypothesis concerning precursors to modern capitalism’s preeminent corporate organizational
form, testifies to Weber’s scholarly personality.
With respect to the subject of property, Weber’s Dissertation is significant for a number of
reasons. To begin with, it is striking that Weber’s first published definition of property was stated in
terms that so strongly echo the “bundle of rights” definitions in vogue today. 100 Such definitions, as can
be clearly seen in the contemporary work of the economist Yoram Barzel, often point to a relationship of
dependency between property “rights” and the organizational structure of social relationships. 101 This
was certainly true for Weber’s treatment, which was historically and legally sophisticated in its analysis
of the interdependence between property and organized social relationships. This theme was one to
which Weber would repeatedly return, and it formed part of his continued project to explore the role of
law in economy and society. 102
Furthermore, Weber’s utilization of primary legal texts in an effort to identify the source(s) of an
“ideational” (cultural) shift toward viewing the firm as a separate legal entity with property-related rights
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COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2001, Jose Harris ed.) (first published in 1887 as Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft).
99
See, e.g., Bruce Keith & Morton G. Ender, The Sociological Core: Conceptual Patterns and Idiosyncrasies in
the Structure and Content of Introductory Sociology Textbooks, 1940-2000, 32 TEACHING SOCIOLOGY 19, 27
(2004); Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 1 (2001); Michael Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa, Sociological Rational Choice Theory, 23
ANNUAL REV. SOC. 191, 196 (1997). As these journals and titles partially indicate, references to these concepts
cross a wide spectrum in sociology, from rational choice theory to sociology of religion and communications
research in the tradition of Robert K. Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld.
100
See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For a contemporary statement of the “bundle of rights” definition,
see e.g., GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 5 (2d ed. 2002).
101
See generally BARZEL, supra note 2.
102
See infra, particularly Section IV.
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and obligations is methodologically interesting, resonating with emerging themes in socio-legal and
cultural studies. 103 In using primary legal texts to identify the sources of cultural change, and in briefly
exploring the role of classically-trained “jurists” in formulating (through analogy to classical Roman law
forms) a legal doctrine for application to emerging corporate entities, Weber indicated a process
according to which legal concepts can play a causal role in social and cultural change. This early
formulation would receive much deeper treatment in Weber’s “sociology of law.” 104

III. The Economic-historical Phase:
A Great Transformation from Agrarian to Commercial Property-Relations

A. Agrarian Property-Relations in Antiquity: The Habilitation

Building to a certain extent off his Dissertation, Weber’s Habilitation established a trajectory for
his future career and a large portion of his substantive scholarly work through its focus on agrarian
property-relations, particularly ownership (Eigentum) and possession (Besitz) of land.

This second

dissertation, published in Fall 1891, was titled “Roman Agrarian History in its Significance for Public and
Private Law”. 105 It was dedicated to the “Herr Privy-Counselor” August Meitzen, 106 a statesman whose
scholarly contributions to statistical “state-science” (Staatswissenschaft) and agrarian history had earned
him an “extraordinary” appointment to University of Berlin’s Faculty of Philosophy. 107 Although Roman
public/administrative and private law figured prominently as source-material for the Habilitation, Weber
directed primary focus on the writings of the Roman land-surveyors (agrimensores), 108 which in 1848103

See RILES, supra note 62; SUCHMAN, supra note 62; see also ANNE NORTON, REPUBLIC OF SIGNS 123-38 (1993).
See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
105
See MAX WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE IN IHRER BEDEUTUNG FÜR DAS STAATS- UND
PRIVATRECHT (1891), as republished in MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE I/2 (Jürgen Deininger ed. 1986) (hereinafter
“Die Römische Agrargeschichte”). This work was only recently translated into English by Richard I. Frank. See
ROMAN AGRARIAN HISTORY IN ITS RELATION TO ROMAN PUBLIC AND CIVIL LAW (Richard I. Frank trans. 2008).
106
See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 92. See also supra note 13 and infra note
107.
107
University of Berlin had been instituted upon the explicitly-formulated ideology that every individual discipline,
all specialized knowledge, must be connected to the foundational discipline: philosophy, the “general knowledge.”
See WIEACKER, supra note 9, at 279 n.2, 293. This ideology manifested itself alongside emergent German
nationalism in the organizational structure of the University, which divided the faculty into four basic categories:
law, medicine, theology and philosophy. See Leo S. Rowe, Instruction in Public Law and Political Economy in
German Universities, 1 ANN. AMERICAN ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 78, 79 (1890). All specialized knowledge not
falling within the categories of law, medicine or theology was classified as “philosophy,” including economics and
statistics. See id. Because his scholarly and professional work pertained to statistical science and “nationaleconomy” (National-Ökonomie), Meitzen was classified as a professor within the Faculty of Philosophy. See id. at
84. As an “extraordinary” professor, he was not allowed to vote alongside his “ordinary” colleagues and probably
received a lower salary. See id. at 79.
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See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 105-6. See also Jürgen Deininger,
Editorischer Bericht, in WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 81-2.
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1852 had been edited and published by Karl Lachmann, Friedrich Blüme and A. Rudorff as Die Schriften
der römischen Feldmesser. 109 While on the one hand the Habilitation served alongside Weber’s
Dissertation to qualify him as a jurisprudential lecturer in “Commercial and Roman (Public and Private)
Law,” 110 it also marked a shift in Weber’s academic scholarship toward a focus on economics and public
administration, which would be manifested in his professional appointments as well as numerous
scholarly works. 111
The Habilitation started from a simple but fundamental question: what caused Rome to be
transformed from a Mediterranean-based city-state, analogous in many respects to contemporaneous
Greek poleis and Phoenician city-states, into a continental empire built on territorial conquest? 112 Starting
from a position close to that of “methodological individualism,” 113 Weber posited the further question:
was this transitional-development an intended (bewußt) outcome, achieved as a result of the power and
ambition of particular social strata and economic interest-groups? 114 If the intentional wielding of socioeconomic power did lie at the heart of Rome’s transformation, what was the object toward which this
socio-economic power was directed, or in slightly different words, what objective motivated the wielding
of this socio-economic power? Weber’s answer to this question was as follows: the ultimate object over
which social conflict took place (das eigentliche Kampfobject) was that which was the “prize of (military)
victory” (der Preis des Siegers): the land of the Roman people, the “public land” (ager publicus). 115
The distinction between public and private things (res publicae, res privatae) – along with a
complementary third category, that of sacred things (res sacrorum) – appears to have been fundamental in
109

See BRIAN CAMPBELL, THE WRITINGS OF THE ROMAN LAND SURVEYORS: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, TRANSLATION
AND COMMENTARY xii, xxii (Journal of Roman Studies Monograph No. 9) (2000). Weber also relied extensively on
the aristocratic Roman agrarian authors, particularly Cato, Varro and Columella, as well as Cicero and other primary
Roman sources. See generally WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, and particularly the
Quellenregister and Personenregister, at 400-18.
110
See Jürgen Deininger, Editorischer Bericht, in WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at
64-7; Käsler, supra note 14, at 7-8. Weber is often described (including by his wife Marianne) as qualifying in both
Roman and German law (in addition to commercial law) but this is incorrect – formally, he was never “habilitated”
in German law. See Jürgen Deininger, Editorischer Bericht, in WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra
note 105, at 65n.5; cf. MARIANNE WEBER, MAX WEBER: A BIOGRAPHY 115 (Harry Zohn trans. & ed., Transaction
Publishers ed. 1988) (1975).
111
See generally Käsler, supra note 14.
112
See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 101-2. See also MAX WEBER,
AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE IM ALTERTUM, originally published in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (1909), and
republished by Marianne Weber in MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE ZUR SOZIAL-UNDWIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE 190-91, 218-19 (1924) (hereinafter “AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE”); for an English translation,
see THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS (R. I. Frank trans., Verso edition, 1988 (NLB edition
1976)).
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Weber explicitly embraced a position of methodological individualism (i.e. the methodological position that the
basic unit of sociological explanation must be the individual person, rather than collective social entities, e.g. nationstates) in Economy and Society. See WEBER, supra note 8, at 13-19; see also SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 23, 163-64
(1998).
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See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 101-2.
115
See id. at 102.
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its cultural significance to the Roman people, and particularly to Roman lawyers. 116 Evidence for the
distinction appears in the oldest written Roman laws, The Twelve Tables, 117 which were drafted circa 451450 B.C. 118 Over the course of the Republican period (c. 510-27 B.C.) the distinction was formalized, so
that by the time of Gaius’ Institutes (c. 160-79 A.D.) it was possible for a Roman jurist to state
definitively that:

things which are under human law [i.e. not governed by divine law] are either public or
private. Public things are regarded as no one’s property, for they are thought of as
belonging to the whole body of the people [the universitas]. Private things are those
belonging to individuals. 119
This distinction was applied to all things, across the categorical division between things with a physical
embodiment (res corporales) – things capable of being touched – and things without a physical
embodiment (res incorporales), which cannot be touched. 120
The corporeal (tangible) thing that was arguably preeminent in both cultural and economic
significance to the Romans, as well as so many of their Mediterranean contemporaries, was land (ager). 121
In the agriculturally-based communities of the ancient Mediterranean world, possession of land was vital
to basic survival. 122 Moreover, wealth tended to be conceptualized in terms of land and agricultural
improvements, particularly horses and cattle. 123 In order to obtain loans for acquisition of land and its
116

Note that the word “republic” derives from res publica, the public thing (or property). See CICERO, THE
REPUBLIC I.XXV. The English word “commonwealth” captures this conception very nicely.
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at 5.
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AL., ANCIENT GREECE: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 1-9, 283-85 (1999).
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continued improvement, the poorest members of ancient society were often forced to offer their own
bodies to secure the loans, with the result that debt-slavery was common. 124 As a result, the archetypal
lawgiver, in the Greek and Roman conception at least, was the man who could resolve repeated and bitter
conflicts over the distribution of land through allotment procedures. 125
According to Cicero, expansion of Roman land through a combination of treaties and military
conquests began at Rome’s inception, initiated by the legendary founder Romulus sometime in the 8th
Century B.C. 126 Cicero attributed to Romulus’ successor, Numa Pompilus (late 8th to early 7th Century
B.C.), the first division and allocation among Roman citizens of land acquired in this manner. 127
Although this record is the stuff of legend rather than historical fact, having been articulated long
afterward by Roman authors, 128 it provides tantalizing hints at the origin of a practice that seems to have
been formalized as early as the 4th Century B.C.: treating land acquired through military expansion as
“public land” (ager publicus), that is, as land belonging to the populus Romanus collectively as a
universitas. 129
Colonist-farmers (coloni) were sent out to settle on the land in colonies (colonia), having been
granted legally-protected possession by the populus Romanus, which during the republican period was
embodied in the Senate. 130 In certain limited cases, the conquered land might pass into private ownership
(dominium), either because it was purchased from the populus Romanus by an individual, or because it
was allocated directly to an individual, a process sometimes referred to as “viritane assignment”. 131
However, the vast majority of land acquired by conquest was regarded as belonging to the populus
124
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125
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Romanus: “viritane assignments” were politically controversial, and the establishment of individual
ownership through purchase apparently occurred infrequently. 132
Thus the situation that developed over the course of the Roman Republican period with respect to
landed property appears to have been generally as follows. Outright ownership of land by private
individuals had existed at least from the time of the Twelve Tables (c 450 B.C.), but it was rare, being
limited primarily to ancient wealthy families (the senatorial classes, which at first only included the
patricians and later expanded to include the equites) and the immediate territory around Rome, with very
limited patchwork additions across the wider Italian peninsula. The vast majority of the land acquired in
the course of Rome’s military expansion across the Italian peninsula, North Africa, Spain and southern
Europe was regarded as ager publicus, “owned” by the populus Romanus, but legally under the
possession of public corporate bodies (municipia, colonia, praefecturae) as well as private individuals.
In general, legally-protected possession of the ager publicus implied the legally-sanctioned ability
to make use of the land and profit from its fruits (usus and fructus, often referred to together as
usufruct). 133 It was therefore possible to profit extensively from the ager publicus without having legal
ownership. The skilled professionals who enabled this complex system to develop through their detailed
surveys of the land (establishing boundaries and separating public from private land), their records of
land-assignments, and their assistance in resolving disputes relating to ownership, possession, and taxobligations pertaining to the land, were the agrimensores. 134
With this background, Weber’s inquiry in the Roman Agrarian History comes into greater focus,
and his source-materials take on added significance.
In his introduction, Weber emphasized the “sharp contrast” between a situation in which persons
living on and/or making use of land are merely granted a kind of “precarious” possession of public land,
and the alternative situation “bearing the stamp of consciousness and modernity on its forehead”: the
private, individual ownership of land and soil (Grund und Boden), which is consequentially attended by
the “individualistic motivations” of free disposition of title by proprietors, at increasing levels of velocity,
or mobility (Beweglichkeit). 135
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In striking similarity to his Dissertation, Weber was interested in identifying the source of an
ideational shift toward a particular property-related conception, in this case the “ownership-concept”
(Eigentumsbegriff). 136 Moreover, also in striking similarity to his Dissertation, Weber was interested in
locating the economic ideas (wirtschaftliche Gedanken) emergent from Roman agrarian practice, which
corresponded to this essentially juristic concept of “ownership” (Eigentum). 137 In seeking to understand
the historical processes according to which conceptions from a particular area of the economy were
brought together with concepts from legal practice and theory, Weber was again seeking to understand the
complex interaction between law and the economy, to which he would return so often in his later work.
One of Weber’s central arguments in his Habilitation was that the legal changes corresponding to
the economic changes he would investigate – the shift toward a conception of land analogous to the
private-ownership-concept and the growth of an economic industry centered around the profit-oriented
exchange of property-titles (i.e. capitalistic exchange) – were not to be sought for primarily in Roman
private law and freedom of contract, but rather were located in Roman public and administrative law. 138
The chronological location of these developments, Weber argued, could be delineated by beginning with
the Agrarian Law of 111 B.C., - which followed a period of intense conflict over land-allocations and
transformed vast expanses of the ager publicus into privately owned land – and focusing particularly on
the Roman Republic’s final century, then following the course of developments through to the Imperial
age.

139

From the soil of that Imperial age would emerge the “manorial dominion system”

(Grundherrschaft) of the early middle ages. 140
Weber began his Habilitation by examining in extensive detail the various forms of landmeasurement utilized by the Roman land-surveyors. 141 By combining these sources with earlier Roman
writings and legal sources, Weber sought to sketch out an historical account of the development of the
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measurement-forms described by the land-surveyors. 142 Such a task presented significant challenges, in
particular because the Roman land-surveyors’ writings date from a much later period, i.e. the 2d century
A.D. through the 5th and 6th centuries A.D. 143 Weber’s primary objective, however, was to establish a
relationship between these measurement-forms and Roman public law, particularly tax-administration. 144
In taking the position that the methods and forms of Roman land-surveying and allotment resulted from
the particular characteristics of Roman public administration, Weber explicitly argued against an
alternative perspective, which was that these forms and methods originated from particular ethnic or
cultural characteristics of the Roman people and their neighbors. 145
The bulk of Weber’s Habilitation was devoted to an examination of the status of various types of
land under Roman public and private law. 146 The complexity of the underlying materials and the
technicality of Weber’s arguments render a detailed treatment beyond the scope of this article. Moreover,
certain of the arguments relied on categorizations of land developed by August Meitzen in the course of
his research, which Weber later viewed as being somewhat inappropriate for application to ancient
Rome. 147 Nevertheless, even if he later expressed a reluctance to use the same conceptual categories in
describing the Roman developments, Weber seems to have continued to adhere to the position expressed
in his dissertation concerning the fundamental nature and implications of the developments.
The basic course of development can be summarized as follows: through a combination of (1)
detailed delineation of land-boundaries by the land-surveyors, (2) the Agrarian Laws, (3) the operation of
occupatio under Roman private law (which transformed public land into privately owned land through
active possession and use of the land over a period of years), and (4) the practice (developed by Julius
Caesar then carried to its extreme by Augustus and his successors) of assigning land-ownership to veteran
soldiers as a reward for their service, the Roman ager publicus was transformed into privately-owned land,
or its equivalent in the form of long-term, inheritable leaseholds. 148 The combination of certain,
enforceable boundaries across such a vast expanse of land, along with the long-term property interests
provided by formal ownership or long-term, inheritable and transferable possession under leaseholds of
various kinds, enabled an extensive commerce in land-titles to emerge, with the result that Rome became
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a center for profit-oriented (capitalistic) exchange in landed property and related tax-farming
opportunities. 149

B. Agrarian Property-Relations in Antiquity: Later Works
Many of the themes emerging from Weber’s Habilitation would emerge in later work as well. In
1896-1898, Weber published works on the demise of ancient culture and agrarian relations in antiquity,
followed in 1909 by a final essay on agrarian relations in antiquity. 150 The works on agrarian relations in
antiquity and the demise of ancient culture were collected together and published posthumously by
Marianne Weber in 1924. 151 Judging by the book-length essay on agrarian relations in antiquity, Weber
continued to believe that the emergence of extensive land-ownership and long-term leaseholds in the late
Roman Republic, which was enabled to a great extent by the Roman land-surveyors, was a deeply
significant event in Roman socio-economic history, both for the Romans themselves and for the medieval
Europe that would follow. 152
As for the origin of the “abstract ownership-concept” itself, which Weber had identified as a
vitally important object of investigation in his Habilitation, 153 he argued in his later work that its “seed”
(Keim) was to be found in the absolute “father-power” (patria potestas) that was so distinctive and
characteristic of ancient Rome. 154
Weber’s primary point of comparison in articulating this thesis was ancient Greek socio-legal
culture,

155

which scholars continue to believe contained a property-conception analogous to “possession”

(possessio, Besitz), a concept of “ownership” (dominium, Eigentum) never having developed. 156
Although father-power (the power of a male head-of-extended-household over the household’s members
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and possessions) seems to have been characteristic of Indo-European socio-legal culture in general, 157 the
distinctive aspect of Roman socio-legal culture was the degree to which collective public (“state”)
jurisdictional power stopped “on the threshold of the House” (an der Schwelle des Hauses) and
“Household-law” (Hausrecht), which Weber equated to dominium, was applied to “wives, children,
slaves and livestock” (familia pecuniaque). 158
From this historical vantage-point, one can immediately see why Weber continued to view the
concept of ownership – with its connections to power, domination, and legal jurisdiction – as being so
significant when extended to vast expanses of land: here is the source of territorial jurisdiction, combined
with jurisdiction over persons in a dependent relationship, which was characteristic of medieval sociolegal culture, particularly the “manorial dominion system.” 159 Such power-laden social relationships
among owners of vast land-expanses, workers who labored on their estates, and emerging political
organizations continued to excite Weber’s interests throughout his lifetime.

C. Agrarian Property-Relations in the Early-Modern Transformation of Central Europe

Although much of his work relating to agrarian economies focused on antiquity, Weber also
showed great interest in the fading agrarian economies of his own day. 160 His 1904 presentation to an
international scholarly congress in St. Louis provides insights with particular relevance to contemporary
North Americans, in part because it included explicit comparisons with the U.S. agricultural situation, and
also because it was intentionally crafted to acquaint Americans with the “peculiar” characteristics of
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Nineteenth Century Continental European agrarian social relationships. 161 In this essay, Weber provided
an especially cogent theory as to the economic and cultural processes according to which Central Europe
made the transition from static agrarian societies to dynamic market-based economies. The transition was
not complete at the time he was writing, and thus his observations – while tinged at times with an
unpleasant German nationalism – are invaluable in deciphering certain stages in that transition that may
no longer be visible from a contemporary vantage-point.
In Weber’s time, German agricultural workers were placed in the inferior social class of
“peasants” (Bäuerin), in sharp contrast to the U.S. “farmers,” who were viewed as entrepreneurial
agricultural workers. 162 Nevertheless, Weber was quick to point out to his U.S. audience that the
economic and legal situation of peasants differed greatly between East and West Germany, and had
changed substantially over the course of Germany’s history. 163 The East-German peasant, whose type
had evolved to a limited extent with the emergence of capitalist agriculture, was the Instmann. 164 The
Instleute were dependents of manorial landowners: the Grundherren of the Grundherrschaft (manorialdominion) system. 165 This Grundherrschaft system had existed throughout Germany into the Sixteenth
Century, and it was the manner in which it dissolved that determined the differences between East and
West German agricultural-conditions. 166
In order to conceptualize the property-relations characterizing the medieval manorial system, it is
necessary to clear one’s mind of characteristically modern notions of “property rights,” and instead to
imagine property-relations that involve complex, corresponding rights-and-obligations among persons
with respect to things, especially land. 167 Although the “lord of the manor” (Grundherr) was the only true
“owner” (Eigentümer) of the land, the peasants possessed parcels of land under long-term (effectively
161

See Max Weber, Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany, in H.H. GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS, FROM MAX
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 363-85 (Oxford University Press Paperback ed. 1958) (1946) (adapted from the
translation of C.W. Seidenadel, published in 1906 along with other presentations given at the Congress in a volume
titled Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, under the title “The Relations of the Rural
Community to other Branches of Social Science”). For Marianne Weber’s description of their trip to America, see
Marianne Weber, supra note 110, at 279-304.
162
See id. at 365.
163
See id. at 365-85.
164
See TRIBE, supra note 160, at 102-3; WEBER, supra note 161, at 374-5 (unfortunately the English does not
provide any indication of Weber’s German terminology, and thus it must be inferred that Weber is describing the
Instleute here). See also ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 113, at 125.
165
See Weber, supra note 161, at 374-5.
166
See id.
167
Although a description of the Grundherrschaft system is implicit throughout Weber’s agricultural writings, he
mostly assumes that his readers are familiar with that system, and allocates his time to describing the transitions that
had occurred and were still occurring in his time. An excellent description of the system, which links it to the
Roman Imperial period and describes its evolution in great detail, with particular discussion of the German case, is
provided by Marc Bloch in Feudal Society. See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 173, 241-54, 266-70 (L.A.
Manyon trans. 1961). An influential legal conception of property that includes both obligations and rights is found
in Samuel Pufendorf. See, e.g., SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 84-104 (Michael
Silverthorne trans., James Tully ed., Cambridge University Press 1991) (1673).

Page 28 of 54

perpetual), inheritable leaseholds (tenures); these leaseholds ideally provided sufficient acreage for a
home and farmland for sustenance, and were in some cases freely transferable upon payment of an
investiture fee. 168 In addition to the peasants’ tenures and the landowner’s home, the overall territorial
estate was divided into subcategories, based on the varying rights and obligations attached to the type of
land. 169 Although the demesne was exclusively the manorial lord’s cultivatable land, other types of land
(e.g. “arable,” “meadow”) could be cultivated by the peasant as well, subject to the preemptive right of
the lord. 170 The tenured peasants owed certain labor duties to the lord, such as working his demesne for a
set number of days in the year, as well as rents (sometimes also described as “taxes”), but the lord was
also subject to obligations with respect to the peasants: in addition to recognizing their tenure on his estate,
the lord was considered their protector, a role that was perhaps typically exercised through the lord’s
manorial courts. 171
Despite its inequalities, this Grundherrschaft system had the benefit of producing a relative unity
of material-economic interest among the landlord and his tenured peasants: both benefited when the
manor was productive. 172 Nevertheless, “maximization of production” was not the overriding goal: in
Weber’s words, the question asked according to this form of social order was “How can I give, on this
piece of land, work and sustenance to the greatest possible number of men?” 173 This socio-economic and
legal order would begin to collapse around the Sixteenth Century, but according to very different
processes in East versus West Germany. 174
The decisive difference between East and West Germany, according to Weber, lay in the
landowners’ response to capitalism’s driving force: the individual motivation to maximize profit. 175 In
southern and western Germany, the landowners responded to this motivating force by requiring increased
payments from the peasants, but they did not appropriate the peasants’ tenures. 176 In Germany’s northeast,
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however, the landowners appropriated (“enclosed”) the peasants’ tenures and began to cultivate the land
themselves, hiring certain of the dispossessed peasants as laborers to work the soil for wages. 177
The reasons for differing landowner responses to agricultural capitalism in the Northeast versus
the South and West were varied, but could be distilled into certain common cultural, legal, and economic
factors. 178 From the perspective of culture, Germany’s northeast had been characteristically affected by a
combination of west-German colonization and Slavic patriarchy, which was distinctive in its idealization
of the feudal knight (approximated most closely by the aristocratic Junkers) and its lack of legal customs
protecting the peasantry. 179 Furthermore, from a legal perspective, the Northeast was distinctive in the
degree to which jurisdictional boundaries aligned with proprietary and territorial boundaries, a condition
that enabled manorial lords to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over their peasants. 180
In Weber’s view, however, it was the economic differences that were most important in
determining the landowners’ response to agricultural capitalism. 181 In the South and West, population
was much denser, and there were many more market centers in the form of towns and cities. 182 The
communication and financial exchange that occurred in these market centers was culturally significant, as
well as economically, because it inculcated the knowledge and desire necessary to enable peasants to
increase their agricultural yields. 183 Moreover, the geography was much more differentiated in the South
and West, which enabled a greater variety of agricultural cultivation. 184 All of these conditions enabled
local trade to flourish in the South and West, which meant that the peasants had local markets in which to
sell their wares in exchange for money to pay rents and taxes to the landowners. 185
Thus, in southern and western Germany, the economic conditions were such that landowners did
not need to appropriate the peasants’ tenures; the landowners could simply require higher taxes and rents
from the peasants, and the presence of local trade meant that the peasants had the knowledge and capacity
to raise the funds needed to make the increased payments. 186 In the Northeast, however, conditions were
entirely different: the geography was relatively undifferentiated, land-holdings were much more extensive,
and market-centers in the form of cities and towns were few and far between. 187 For these reasons, it
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would have been impossible for the peasants to increase their payments, and the landowners’ only option
was to raise the agricultural yield by cultivating the land themselves. 188 In order to do so, it was
necessary to appropriate the land entirely, and thus to dispossess the peasants, thereby transforming the
Eastern peasantry into property-less laborers. 189
In Weber’s view, these cultural, legal, and economic factors determined the shape of capitalist
agricultural-transformation in Germany, so that by the time of the French and German Revolutions (178999 and 1848, after which peasants were formally regarded as being “free”), the shape of this
transformation had already been determined. 190 From the perspective of public administration, and
because he believed passionately that Germany should be a strong nation-state, Weber found the Eastern
agricultural situation untenable. 191 Although he argued that additional empirical study was needed in
order to accurately assess the impact of this capitalistic agricultural transformation on peasant socialpsychological motivations, he believed it was driving the German peasantry to emigrate from the
Northeast, either into German cities or to America, in alarming numbers. 192 This meant that migrant
workers, in particular Polish workers, were being brought onto the Northeastern estates during the laborintensive periods of the agricultural cycle. 193 Weber saw this regular influx of non-German workers as
being extremely harmful to German national self-interest, both defensively and culturally. 194
Although he did not cast the East-German landowners (the Junkers) as villains for their response
to capitalistic forces in agriculture, he did see their cultural and economic interests as working against the
German nation’s interests. 195 With respect to distribution of Northeastern landed property, he believed
that the German nation had a responsibility to expropriate portions of the Junkers’ land in order to
establish smaller agricultural holdings in the form of leases from the state. 196 This put Weber in direct
opposition to the Junkers, an opposition consistent with his advocacy for free exchanges (Börsen) for
agricultural commodities, securities, and derivatives (including commodity futures). 197
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D. Commercial Property-Relations in the Modern World:
The Bourse Writings
Weber’s writings on the Bourse were extensive, as is evidenced by the fact that they fill two
volumes of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe. 198 That these articles were written in the 1890s is no
coincidence, for it was during this period that securities and commodities exchanges were becoming an
issue of great socio-legal and economic significance, not only in Germany but also in North America. 199
In Germany, commissions were established to study the exchanges, the primary question being how and
whether such exchanges should be regulated at a national level. 200
Utilizing data gathered by the Börsenenquetekommission, Weber took the position that the
exchanges would be beneficial to German agriculture and agriculturally-related industry. 201 Nevertheless,
he noted that the forms of commercial property being established through these exchanges were
characterized by vastly-different social relationships, relationships that were distinctive in their
impersonality, and in the degree to which they posed financial danger to the unwary.
Weber addressed both major types of exchange: securities (Effekten, Fonds) and commodities
(Produkten, Waren) exchanges. 202 However, it was the latter that seem to have presented the greatest
difficulties politically. 203 In particular, the issue of “grain futures” was a matter of deep controversy, and
by taking sides on this issue Weber set himself up in opposition to the politically-powerful Junkers. 204
As Weber had noted in his address to the international scholars assembled in St. Louis, the
Junkers had become powerful voices for agricultural protectionism. 205 Because they perceived grain
futures markets as threatening their ability to control grain prices, and as potentially introducing great
instability into grain markets, they preferred that such financial instruments be prohibited altogether. 206
The Junkers were supported in this objective by the fact that jurists were embroiled in controversy over
198

See MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE I/5 (Knut Borchardt & Cornelia Meyer-Stoll eds. 1999) (hereinafter
“Collected Bourse-Writings”).
199
See generally Einleitung, COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 198. For the U.S. history, see JONATHAN
BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 127-66 (1997); CHARLES R. GEIST,
WALL STREET: A HISTORY 124-51 (1997). For more specific discussions of commodities markets, see Armando T.
Belly, The Derivative Market in Foreign Currencies and the Commodity Exchange Act: The Status of Over-theCounter Futures Contracts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1455, 1460-63 (1997); William L. Stein, The Exchange-Trading
Requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 VAN. L. REV. 473, 474-78 (1988). For a representation of the way
U.S. lawyers perceived futures markets in the late 1800’s, see 3 The Central Law Journal 121, 134-35 (Seymour D.
Thompson ed., February 25, 1876).
200
See Einleitung, COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 198, at 3-5, 25-91.
201
See id. at 66-74, 91-108; see also BORCHARDT, supra note 197, at 141-42.
202
See, e.g., Die Börse I, Zweck und äußere Organisation der Börsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra
note 198, at 141-43 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & SOC. 305 (Steven Lestition trans. 2000)).
203
See BORCHARDT, supra note 197, at 159-62; TRIBE, supra note 197, at 242-45.
204
See id.
205
See Weber, supra note 161, at 382; supra note 161 and accompanying text.
206
See BORCHARDT, supra note 197, at 159-62; TRIBE, supra note 197, at 242-45.

Page 32 of 54

how futures contracts should be legally categorized; because such trades are most often completed
without exchange of the underlying commodity and involve a certain degree of speculation regarding the
direction of future commodity prices, a dominant legal perspective of the time was that such contracts
were a form of gambling, and thus void (i.e. unenforceable). 207
In retrospect, Weber seems extraordinarily far ahead of his time in arguing that, rather than
destabilizing grain prices, grain futures would have the opposite effect: that through the “arbitrage” of
professional futures traders, the cyclical rise and fall in grain prices resultant from seasonal gluts and
dearths would be stabilized, and the cash price for grain would reflect general information about the grain
market as opposed to merely cyclical or local conditions of supply-and-demand. 208
From the perspective of this article, however, Weber’s technical arguments concerning the
functioning and effects of the Bourse are less significant than his discussion of the overall impact that the
growing financial markets were having, and would continue to have, on property-relations.

These

developments were particularly emphasized in Weber’s Börse I essay. 209
Weber began that essay by stating that “[t]he Bourse is an institution (Einrichtung) of modern,
high-volume, commercial trade (Großhandelsverkehr).” 210 After outlining the basic forms and functions
of the Bourse, he then turned to a discussion of bond markets, which were historically the first
“securities” to emerge. 211 He discussed the fact that these markets enabled the possessory-classes “to
invest their property” (ihr Vermögen anlegen) and the state, in turn, to raise funds needed for public
projects. 212 The implications of this development for property-relations, the relationship between the
owner of the security (the bond) and the obligor (the state or a corporation), are extremely significant: it is
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the impersonality (Unpersönlichkeit) of these relations that is their most important (sociological)
characteristic. 213
Weber uses the term Herrschaft in this context, which is significant for two reasons: first because
he is describing a transition from an older form of Herrschaft, that of the Grundherr, 214 and second
because he seems to be simultaneously evoking a legal sense (as a translation for dominium, i.e.
“ownership”) and a more sociological sense, that of “domination” (or authority). 215 In describing the
transition from Grundherrschaft to “Herrschaft ‘des Kapitals’” Weber describes a transition from a
hierarchical and personal property-relation, characteristic of a by-gone era, to a property-relation that is
impersonal and less hierarchical, characteristic of the capitalistic era. 216
The transition from agrarian property-relations to commercial property-relations parallels the
transition from patriarchy and patrimony to bureaucracy and modern, rational capitalism. 217 Indeed, the
point may very well be that these are the same transition, viewed through different conceptual
frameworks.

Remembering that dominium is the Latin word for ownership, as well as

mastership/lordship (comparable to the German Herrschaft), we may be struck anew by the overlap
between property and domination that Weber and his classically-trained contemporaries would have
intuited immediately through the evocations of language.
Weber’s exploration of domination (authority) as a sociological type concept would come later, in
his sociological phase.

E. Significance of Weber’s Economic-Historical Phase for a Sociological Theory of Property

In Weber’s economic-historical phase, strictly economic and material aspects of propertyrelations receive an especially vivid presentation. Agrarian property – property connected to land and its
profits – forms the base of a conceptual framework, with commercial property (financial instruments,
business “goodwill,” trade secrets) comprising a transitional development that is sketched to illuminate
contrasts or to hint at future implications. Land is an embodied (corporeal) and tangible object of
property, as are the beings (animal and human) who work it and the improvements placed upon it.
Weber’s agrarian property-relations are personal, hierarchical, and materially-rooted social relationships.
Out from the richly-portrayed material and economic details, however, Weber abstracted a
number of interesting cultural theses.

Firstly, that it was an “ideational shift” that produced the
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motivational force for Rome’s vast land-acquisitions on the European continent, and that this was due to
incentives created by Roman public and administrative law. Secondly, that the “abstract ownership
concept” is to be credited to Roman legal culture, with its distinctively-potent, patriarchal, “private”
sphere of unfettered personal power over dependent persons and objects. Thirdly, that the ability to
communicate knowledge and ideas to one another in local markets helped West German peasants increase
their production capacities significantly enough to pay increased taxes on their small plots of land,
thereby mitigating the perceived necessity for appropriation by capitalistically-driven manorial lords.
Continuing a theme from his legal phase, Weber’s economic-historical phase presents property as
a social phenomenon, a phenomenon characterized by social relationships organized around specified
“rights” and “duties” vis-à-vis valued things. In his economic-historical phase, however, Weber added a
richness of detail concerning a concrete manifestation of property that has been common and
economically-important throughout history, namely agrarian property.
In pointing to significant contrasts with commercial property, which was rapidly becoming more
important in his own day, Weber revealed the contours of a “great transformation,” 218 one that can be
viewed as paralleling and complementing those revealed by his sociological contemporaries. 219 As with
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 220 Weber’s great transformation accords causal force to property in
society. However, with Weber the concept of property is given fuller treatment, both analytically and
empirically. Compared to Weber, Marx’s theoretical conceptualization of property is exogenous (i.e., it is
taken as given) and monolithic (private property in the form of ownership is all that is contemplated).
Weber’s theory of property brings property into the theory of social relationships (the theory
“endogenizes” property), and it allows for much more concrete detail in the diversity of rights (use, ability
to profit, possession, and ownership) and obligations comprising property.
To more fully glimpse the wealth of insight in Weber’s sociological theory of property, we now
turn to the final phase of his development, the sociological phase. Here we see the final, sociological
articulation of his theory of property, namely that property is dependent on organized social relationships
that have been closed to “outsiders.” And here we see the extent to which Weber’s final development as
a sociological thinker built on his earlier phases of development, the legal and the economic-historical.
218
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IV. The Sociological Phase:
Property and Organized Social Closure

As the first decade of the Twentieth Century ended, Weber directed his attention to sociology. In
1904, he had joined Edger Jaffé and Werner Sombart in assuming editorial control of the Archiv für
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Archive for Social Science and Social Policy), and in the same year
his essay on the “Objectivity of Social-scientific and Socio-political Knowledge” had appeared in that
periodical. 221 In 1909 Weber co-founded the German Sociological Association (Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Soziologie), and began to occasionally refer to himself as a “sociologist.” 222
Early in that same year, he accepted an invitation to serve as editor for a project to assemble a
compendium of foundational concepts and principles for “social economics” (Grundriss der
Sozialökonomik, hereinafter the “Outline of Social Economics”). 223 This work was conceived as a
replacement for a previous Handbook of Political Economy (Handbuch der Politischen Ökonomie),
which the publisher viewed as being somewhat out of date in relation to contemporary developments in
German and Austrian economics. 224
Between 1910 and 1914, Weber expended considerable effort in assembling contributions by
German and Austrian economists to the Outline of Social Economics, 225 and in composing his own
contributions to the Outline. 226 In his correspondence and in his manuscript footnotes, Weber referred to
his contributions as Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft – Economy and Society – and this is the title under which
Weber’s manuscripts written for the Outline during this period were posthumously published. 227 The
early manuscripts (written between 1910 and 1914) include what is now published as “Part Two: The
221
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Economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers” (hereinafter referred to as the “1914
Manuscripts”) in the English edition of Economy and Society, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus
Wittich. 228
Weber’s work from this period also includes a 1913 publication in Logos (the International
Journal for the Philosophy of Culture). 229 This 1913 piece (hereinafter the “Logos Essay”) was titled “On
Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology.”

According to Weber, it served as a counterpart and

supplement to the conceptual exposition written in 1919-1920, posthumously published as Chapter 1 of
the finalized manuscripts submitted for publication shortly before Weber’s death in 1920 (hereinafter the
“1920 Manuscripts”). 230
Weber’s Logos Essay articulates precise definitions for sociological categories used throughout
the 1914 Manuscripts. 231 These categories were developed from Rudolf Stammler’s jurisprudential
exposition on the relationship between law and economics.

232

Nevertheless, although Weber

acknowledged the extent to which Stammler’s analytical categories served as the starting-point for his
own exposition, he positioned his contribution in direct opposition to Stammler. 233 Objecting to
“historical materialism” as an influence on Stammler’s “disastrous” social theory, Weber characterized
his own “construction of sociological concepts” as an exposition of what Stammler “should have
meant.” 234

A. Sociological Categories for Understanding and Explaining Property-Relations

Weber began the Logos Essay with the foundational declaration that human behavior (Verhalten),
like all empirical occurrences, exhibits two types of observable patterns: (1) regularities of successive
development (i.e., causal regularities) and (2) relational structures (“complexes” or “compounds,”
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Zussamenhänge). 235 What makes human behavior unique, however, is the fact that it has meaning (Sinn)
to the actors who engage in the behavior. 236 For this reason, these empirical patterns can be interpretively
explained on the basis of certain types of inferred intentional orientation that cause actions by individuals
to exhibit regularities in relational structure and course of development. 237
These types of intentional orientation can be understood as patterns of directedness in
consciousness, cognition, and thought, i.e. in the formation of meaning and intention. They do not
include all the unique content of a particular individual’s thoughts, emotions, or motivations. 238 Rather,
they are general forms of thought, ways of conceptualizing choices, possibilities of action, and
probabilities of success. 239 These types of intentional orientation are inferentially interpretable by
sociologists when their patterns of directedness are (1) social (oriented to others in meaning and action)
and (2) purposive (goal-oriented). 240
The type of intentionally-oriented social behavior that can be interpreted (inferred) with the
greatest degree of validity and certainty by sociologists is behavior that is rational in the sense that the
individual instrumentally and calculatingly uses scarce means to achieve a valued end. 241 In order to
arrive at a valid interpretation, a sociologist can use this type of social action as a starting-point for
analysis, explaining deviations on the basis of external causal factors and/or differences in meaningful
intention that led to the deviational empirical pattern. 242
Although he had some interest in isolated instances of social action, Weber’s primary interest was
in patterns of ongoing socio-relational structures: social groupings and their course of development over
time. This is particularly evident in the Logos Essay and the 1914 Manuscripts, where Weber refers to
social action as “communal action” (Gemeinschaftshandeln) and organizes his discussion on the basis of
differing types of social grouping: household, family, kinship, and neighborhood communities, ethnic and
racial communities, religious, political and hierocratic communities, class-based-associations, statuscommunities, and the market. 243 According to Weber, these distinctive types of social grouping are
235
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characterized by their distinctive relationship-structures, courses of development, and by the patterns of
directedness in meaning that condition these relationship-structures and courses of development. 244
Later, in Chapter 1 of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber refined his categories of social grouping,
moving to a more abstract level in distinguishing two types of “social relationships”: “associative”
(Vergesellschaftung) and “communal” (Vergemeinschaftung). 245 The difference between these two rests
on the meaning that social actors impute to the social relationship. In the case of communal social
relationships, actors subjectively regard the members of the community as “belonging together,” whereas
in the case of associative social relationships, actors regard the social relationship as a necessary means
for achieving a shared goal. 246
Viewing social relationships from this clearly-delineated and abstracted perspective, Weber
continued to view such relationships as being characterized by their distinctive relationship-structures,
while also emphasizing patterns in the directedness in meaning that condition these relationship-structures
and their courses of development.
One of the most important patterns of directedness in meaning emerges out of the shared
orientation to an “Order” (Ordnung) by the members of a social relationship. 247 In his 1913 Logos Essay,
Weber distinguished two types of “Foundational Order”. 248 The first type is both fundamentally and
formally hierarchical, in the sense that it results from unilateral demands issued by some person(s) and
complied with by others. 249 The second type is formally egalitarian, in the sense that it results from a
mutual declaration issuing from all persons to one another. 250
Only in the most purely rational, limiting cases will these Foundational Orders – their concepts,
principles, and rules (Ordnungen) – be explicitly articulated in written documents formally constituting
the social relationship, i.e. in a constitution or charter, and/or in other bylaws, regulations and contractual
documents. 251 Moreover, the ways that particular individuals orient themselves to an Order (with its
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associated concepts, principles, and rules) may be by refusing to comply with it, or by covertly deviating
from it (e.g. cheating in a game of cards). 252
Nevertheless, an Order should be treated as being empirically “in force” (Geltung) to the extent
that individuals expect other individuals to behave in accordance with the Order. 253 This concept of the
degree to which an Order is empirically “in force” was carried over to the 1920 Manuscripts, where
Weber defined it as the “probability” (Chance) that social action will be conditioned by the Order. 254
Mutual orientation to an Order is vitally-important to social action because it helps individuals to
form reasoned expectations as to what their social “others” will do, thereby enabling them to calculate
their own probabilities of success in achieving a particular goal,

255

or to deliberately conform to a

command they view as binding on them. To the extent that an Order is believed to exist and is
empirically in force, therefore, it plays a causal role in the social action of individuals, contributing to
patterns of directedness in meaning and in the formation of socio-relational structures. 256
Having drawn on Weber’s Logos Essay and the 1920 Manuscripts to elaborate certain key
concepts in Weber’s sociology, we can now turn to his sociological theory of property.

B. Weber’s Sociological Theory of Property

Weber discussed property-related concepts in two sections of the Logos Essay.
discussion is provided in the section of the essay addressing “Associational Action”,

257

The first

while the second

discussion is provided in the section of the essay addressing “Consensus” (Einverständnis). 258 These are
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two basic types of socio-relational structure, formed through patterns of communal social action and
corresponding to two basic types of Order.
Associational Action is a socio-relational structure formed as a result of relatively-explicitly
shared purposes; the members agree upon a Foundational Order and related rules that are rationally
designed to achieve the association’s shared purposes. 259 Consensus, on the other hand, characterizes a
socio-relational structure formed through patterns of communal action oriented to an Order that does not
arise out of agreement on shared purposes. 260 Individuals orient themselves to an Order “as if” it had
emerged through their agreement on concepts and rules, even though they haven’t actually agreed to
anything. 261
The archetypal form (“ideal type”) of Associational Action, according to Weber, is characterized
by deliberate (“rational”) agreement on an Order that explicitly defines the substantive capacities and
means for the collective action of the associates in seeking to achieve the specified purposes. 262 The
resulting association is a Zweckverein, an “intentional-association” (“goal-oriented-association”) or
“voluntary association.” 263 In this ideal-typical form of Associational Action, the foundational agreement
recording the agreed-upon Order – the “Charter” and By-Laws, or “Constitution” (Satzung) – will specify
which “tangible goods” (Sachgüter) and “funds” (Leistungen) shall be administered and made available
for the stipulated purposes of the association. 264 These goods and funds comprise the association’s
“special purpose fund,” its “designated property” (Zweckvermögen). 265
This is the purest, archetypal case of Associational Action, according to Weber. 266

His

description clearly fits a modern corporation, and this may very well be the example that he had in mind.
However, he went on to describe certain variations that cases of Associational Action might exemplify.
For example, the agreed-upon Order (the decisive criterion, according to Weber) might be comprised
merely of ad hoc rules, or there may be no designated staff for authorized action and enforcement. 267 An
259

See id. at 160-66.
See id. at 166-73.
261
See id.
262
See id. at 163-65.
263
See id. at 163. See also WEBER, supra note 8, at 41.
264
See THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 163.
265
See id. In addition to designating the association’s property, the enacted Order will specify: the types of action
that the association shall be authorized to execute, the persons (“Executive Bodies,” Vereinsorgane) to whom such
action shall be attributed, and the consequences that such action shall have for the association; the Executive Bodies
with responsibility for managing the association’s property, and the way in which such management is to be
conducted; which services the parties to the association shall provide; which actions by associates are permitted,
prohibited, and permitted; and the “gains” (Vorteile) that associates might anticipate as a result of their participatory
investment in the association. Finally, the enacted Order will specify which Executive Bodies shall be given the
capacity to enforce the stipulated Order, under which conditions, and by which means (the “Enforcement
Instruments,” Zwangsapparat). See id.
266
See id.
267
See id. at 163-65.
260

Page 41 of 54

example of such a variant on Associational Action is the monopolistic “cartel,” which is an association of
independent business entities. 268
As an association of independent entities, the cartel has no staff. 269 Moreover, its common Order
may be relatively limited, merely specifying a litany of prescribed or proscribed actions (e.g. prohibiting
the lowering of prices). 270 Nevertheless, because its monopoly power depends on a limitation of the
number of participants, thereby ensuring exclusivity in relation to valued resource(s) and keeping prices
high, the “cartel” is an example of a “closed” association. 271
Closure against additional participants can occur in associations characterized by mutual
orientation to an explicitly agreed-upon Order, and in associations characterized by Consensus (action
oriented “as if” there were an agreed-upon Order). 272 What matters is the fact that in both cases there is
closure against additional participants, thereby creating a de facto monopoly vis-à-vis valued resources. 273
In the case of a “syndicate,” there is some degree of ongoing association among otherwiseindependent business entities, thereby creating an ongoing monopoly, i.e. an ongoing closure against
additional participants vis-à-vis valued resources. 274

It is this continued existence in time that

distinguishes the syndicate from the cartel, according to Weber. 275
An ongoing monopoly, enabled by ongoing associational closure against outsiders vis-à-vis
valued resources, will involve some minimal delineation of rules as to what is prescribed, permitted, or
prohibited for participants. Therefore, an Order will be to some degree articulated, and an organizational
structure will be to some degree created, but this may remain ad hoc rather than being systematized.
Wherever this ongoing closure against additional participants persists, accompanied as this is by an ad
hoc Order, the resulting syndicate association will have de facto property (Vermögen), often quite
extensive. 276
The syndicate is a variant of Associational Action characterized by a lack of staff and an ad hoc
Order. An even more extreme variant is an isolated, rational exchange (Tausch) of goods. 277
The exchange is isolated in the sense that it occurs only one time, and in the absence of any
explicit or implicit agreed-upon Order, let alone a staff to enforce the Order. There is thus no ongoing
“Associational Action” at all. Nevertheless, even in this extreme case, Weber argued that, at a minimum,
268
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the parties to the exchange will be making an implicit agreement as to what is prescribed, prohibited, and
what is permitted. 278 Thus, to a very limited extent, an Order will be emergent from the exchange. 279
What is prescribed is the transfer of the exchanged goods, and possibly also the obligation to guarantee
the continued possession of the transferee(s) against interference by third parties. What is prohibited is
the taking-back of possession by the transferor. What is permitted is the complete and discretionary
exercise of powers of control (Verfügung) over the goods exchanged. 280
The isolated exchange does not create an ongoing association between the parties. An exchange
of goods does not result in the emergence of an “enduring structural entity” and therefore it is neither
“autocephalous” nor “heterocephalous”: there is no structural entity, and therefore there can be no
organizational “head” (cephal, from the Greek word for head). 281 The exchange may occur within the
context of a broader associational Order, and thus be “heteronomously ordered,” as in the case of the
“Market” (Markt). 282 Or in an extreme case it may be exclusively ordered by the bi-lateral expectations
of the parties, based on each party’s “trust” (Vertrauen) that the other party will behave in accordance
with the limited Order emergent from their agreement (autonomously ordered). 283
The important point, however, is that in both cases (heteronomous and autonomous exchange),
the exchange is characterized by an implicit orientation to the action of third parties, parties external to
the parties’ explicit orientation to one another. 284 This renders the exchange a case of Consensus: while
there is at least an implicit agreed-upon Order between the parties to the exchange, there is no such
agreed-upon Order in relation to third parties, at least in the case of the autonomously ordered
exchange. 285
In the case of the autonomously ordered exchange, the parties to the exchange assume an “as if”
Order in relation to third parties. In other words, their social action is a case of Consensual Action. 286 At
a minimum, the “as if” Order enables the parties to the exchange to orient themselves to the expectation
that third parties will respect the transfer of possession (Besitzwechsel) that comprises the heart of the
exchange. 287 In most known historical cases, however, the exchange is heteronomously ordered by some
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type of organized social relationship, the enforcement apparatus of which provides an external guarantee
against interference by third parties with stable possession of the goods exchanged. 288
Stable possession of goods, then, is necessary to exchange of goods. This stable and reliable
possession is enabled by the existence of Consensual or Associational Action, corresponding to an “as if”
or actual Order, which is “in force” by virtue of the enforcement apparatus of some type of social
community, or at a minimum is assumed by the parties to an isolated exchange.
From this brief exposition in the 1913 Logos Essay, we already see the basic outlines of Weber’s
sociological theory of property. Property – here addressed primarily in terms of stable possession of
goods in exchange and the designated property of an intentional association (Zweckverein) – depends
upon “Ordered” social closure, that is, closure of a social relationship against additional participants visà-vis valued resources, which occurs as a result of shared orientation to an explicit or implicit Order.
Significantly, Weber argued that this theory holds true even in the case of isolated exchange. Either the
exchange is heteronomously ordered (in which case there is an Order imposed from outside the exchange)
or the exchange is autonomously ordered (in which case there is an “as if” Order). But either way the
parties exhibit patterns of directedness in meaning through patterns in the formation, maintenance, and
closure of social relationships vis-à-vis one another, third parties, and valued resources.
An Order is an (inferred) pattern of directedness in meaning that organizes the formation and
maintenance of communal and associative social relationships, and that directs their closure vis-à-vis
valued resources. An Order therefore guides and legitimizes the “organized social closure” that enables
the formation and persistence of exclusive “rights and obligations” vis-à-vis things, which is characteristic
of property. Property and organized social closure are two sides of the same phenomenon. 289 And both
are enabled by mutual orientation to an Order.

C. Refining the Theory: The Role of an Order in Organized Social Closure
In a manuscript titled “The Economy and the Orders,” Weber expanded on the relationship
between social action and Order, and on the distinction between two types of “Order”: (1) that which is
legally correct according to the principles and logic of jurisprudence (the “Formally-Correct Legal
Order”), versus (2) that which individuals acting in relation to one another vis-à-vis valued goods and
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services subjectively regard as being in force and therefore orient themselves to (the “Empirically-Valid
Legal Order”), with the result that patterns of stable possession and exchange emerge. 290
Weber defined the “Economic Order” (Wirtschaftsordnung) as the empirically-observable Order
that emerges from (i.e. is conditioned by) two distinct factors: (1) the Consensus-based distribution of de
facto “powers of control and disposal” (Verfügungsgewalt, hereinafter “Dispositional Powers”) over
goods and economic services, and (2) the ways in which such goods and services are used as a result of
these de facto Dispositional Powers. 291
Weber’s primary goal in this manuscript was to show how, and to what extent, the EmpiricallyValid Legal Order impacts the Economic Order. 292 He also discussed various sources for the principles,
rules, and concepts (Normen) that comprise and supplement the Empirically-Valid Legal Order in a
particular community, including Conventions, Customs, and Usages, as well as ethics and religion. 293
Whatever these sources might be, the crucial attribute of all principles, rules, and concepts comprising the
Empirically-Valid Legal Order is the existence of some type of enforcement mechanism, whether this be
a formally-designated staff or the threat of kinship-vengeance. 294
According to Weber, the Empirically-Valid Legal Order may impact an individual’s “interests”
(Interessen) in a number of ways. 295 Of particular importance to the economy, however, is the way in
which the Empirically-Valid Legal Order impacts the individual’s calculation of his chances of stably
keeping economic goods under his possession and control (Verfügung), or of acquiring such possession
and control under given conditions in the future, i.e. of maintaining and/or acquiring Dispositional
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Powers. 296 Indeed, Weber argued, the manipulation of such calculable chances is often what lawmakers
have in mind when they manipulate the Formally-Correct Legal Order.
When the Formally-Correct Legal Order is manipulated and therefore changed, to the extent that
it is Empirically-Valid by virtue of enforcement, Weber argued that it can impact individual calculations
as to chances of maintaining and/or acquiring Dispositional Powers in two possible ways: (1) as an
unintended-effect (Reflexwirkung) of the principle created or manipulated (the articulation of “Objective
Law”), or (2) as a result of the intentional creation of “Subjective Rights.” 297 The existence of these
Subjective Rights means that the individual has certain calculable chances of invoking the enforcement
powers provided by the relevant social community – e.g., the political community – in order to protect
and enforce her Dispositional Powers. 298
For Weber, it was very important that social science (sociology and economics) focus on the
empirical validity of law, especially the way that this validity impacts the individual through his
calculation of chances of protecting or acquiring Dispositional Powers. 299 He sharply criticized Stammler
for confusing the Formally-Correct Legal Order with the Empirically-Valid Legal Order. 300 In order to
facilitate the disentanglement of the Formally-Correct Legal Order from the Empirically-Valid Legal
Order, Weber redefined certain crucial legal categories – possession and obligation – into their
“economic” forms.

“Possession” (Besitz) in this narrow “economic” sense means simply that the

possessor can count on a lack of interference with his control (Verfügung) over the thing possessed. 301
An “exchange” of goods means that this control has been transferred, with the expectation that a roughly
equivalent control over a different good will be provided in return. 302
Weber nonetheless continued to argue that the Formally-Correct Legal Order significantly, if
indirectly, impacts the Empirically-Valid Legal Order. In the 1920 Manuscripts he stated flatly that the
importance of a legal order enforced by the “state” for the modern Economic Order, including the
enforcement of proprietary possession (Besitz) and contractual exchange, cannot be overestimated. 303 He
was also insistent, however, that the Formally-Correct Legal Order not be treated as exogenous; the
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Formally-Correct Legal Order is impacted by economic and cultural changes, albeit through processes
mediated by the culture of the legal profession and the political community. 304
Beginning with the 1914 Manuscripts, Weber focused special attention on the processes
according to which different types of social groupings tend to become closed against additional
participants. 305 In the progression of this closure, Weber argued, the tendency is almost always to create
some type of Legal Order to govern allocation and use of valued resource(s) that are monopolized by
means of the closure against outsiders. 306

When this happens, the social grouping becomes a

“Community of Legal Rights” (Rechtgemeinschaft), and the participants become “right-bearing
associates” (Rechtgenossen). 307
Weber viewed this “enclosure process” as a type of ever-recurring sequence, and as the basis for
“Ownership” (Eigentum) of land, as well as all types of economically-important monopolies. 308 He
granted that the objects monopolized can vary widely – from occupational privileges to natural resources
– depending on the technical nature of the objects and the group’s opportunities for monopolization. 309 In
all such cases, however, group closure results in monopolization vis-à-vis valued resources. By creating
monopolized “rights” to valued resources, possessed either by the group as a whole or allocated to
individuals within the group, this process results in the “Appropriation” of the valued resources; 310 it is
the source of the creation of “property rights,” including those characteristic of Ownership.
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber clarified his discussion of enclosure processes by contrasting
“open” (or “public”, offen) social relationships with “closed” (geschlossen) social relationships. 311 A
social relationship may become closed for varying reasons, he argued, ranging from tradition (arising
from ingrained habits) to intentional social action (that is, action in which a social actor’s use of particular
means is explicitly directed to achieving a particular end, which may be either a moral value or a
consequentialist-materialist goal). 312 Regardless of how the social relationship becomes closed, however,
the key outcome from a closed social relationship is the “monopolistic” control of “appropriated
opportunities” (appropriierte Chancen), and these appropriated opportunities are defined as “rights”
(Rechte). 313 “Ownership” (Eigentum) emerges where these appropriated rights are transmitted through
304
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inheritance, either to individuals or to kinship groups. 314 If the appropriated rights are freely transferable,
“free ownership” (freies Eigentum) is present. 315

D. Further Refining the Theory: Different Modes of Appropriation
In both the 1914 and 1920 Manuscripts, Weber argued that the nature of the goods or useful
services appropriated through monopolization may have extremely important implications for the
patterned course of development taken by social-relational groupings, or for a “society” in general. The
nature of appropriated goods and services is closely connected to particular “Types of DemandSatisfaction”. 316
In the 1914 Manuscripts, Weber had emphasized the extent to which the “moveability” of
appropriated goods conditions the course of development within political communities. 317 In his final
analysis of the processes according to which Appropriation takes place (a discussion that consumes
approximately 40 pages in Chapter 2 of Economy and Society), Weber focused instead on historical
differences in the degree to which the services of particular offices are appropriated, i.e. the extent to
which an individual might have property-related “rights” to a particular job-related position in society, or
the extent to which he and his labor services might be the property of another person. 318 What is
appropriated here is a labor position, or labor services, and therefore this type of Appropriation is closely
connected to the division of labor in society. 319 Corresponding to this type of Appropriation, Weber
argued is a second type, characterized by the ways in which the “material means of production” are
appropriated within a socio-relational grouping. 320
The ways in which both types of Appropriation (Appropriation of labor services and
Appropriation of the material means of production) are conducted and proceed in their course of
development have enormously significant implications for an economy, and the society within which it is
ordered and structured. 321 To use Weber’s earlier terminology, particular modes of Appropriation
produce characteristic types of Economic Order, i.e. characteristic types of Dispositional Power
allocations within a society.
to the tangible or intangible “things” from whence they arise. Rather, it is the specific ways in which these things are
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Moreover, through their influence on Dispositional Power allocations within a society, distinctive
types of Appropriation differentially impact the ways in which valued goods and services may be used to
achieve particular economic goals. In other words, differing types of Appropriation result in (1) differing
types of Dispositional Power allocations, and (2) differing Types of Demand-Satisfaction within a society.
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber drew a distinction between two economic purposes for which
appropriated Dispositional Powers over goods and services might be acquired and used: (1)
administration and consumptive sustenance of a “budgetary unit” (Householding, Haushalt), and (2)
acquisition of additional Dispositional Powers (Profit-Earning, Erwerben). These correspond to differing
methods of valuing the Dispositional Powers available, and differing ways of regarding the total value
available for use over a given period of time. For the budgetary unit, this total value is its “property”
(Vermögen). 322 For purposes of Profit-Earning activity, this total value is the available “capital”
(Kapital). 323 These differing conceptions of the total value of Dispositional Powers over goods and
services correspond to differing types of economic action, according to Weber. 324
To summarize, then, there are multiple distinct modes of Appropriation, modes that are
influenced by the material nature of what is appropriated at the same time that they are influenced by the
Order to which the appropriating members of a social relationship orient themselves in structuring their
relationship.

Culture, social structure, and materiality are all in play in this complex story of

Appropriation. Distinct modes of Appropriation, in turn, have vastly differing economic effects within
society, effects that manifest themselves in differing allocations of Dispositional Power and differing
modes of Demand-Satisfaction. Furthermore, distinct modes of valuing appropriated goods and services
(as household “property” or as profit-earning “capital”) contribute to economic effects by influencing the
way these goods and services are used.
This is a rich and nuanced theory of the economy and of social relationships, a theory that
addresses these social phenomena in each of their three crucial dimensions: structural, material, and
symbolic. It is a sociological theory of property, one that enables explanations of structural states and
dynamic processes, a theory that is capable of addressing property-relations and their implications in a
moment of time, and across time.
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E. Topics for Further Research: The Relationship to Domination and Class

A question that has already been foreshadowed in this article concerns the relationship between
Weber’s theory of property, on the one hand, and his theories of Domination and class, on the other.
Before concluding, I will briefly survey Weber’s discussions pertaining to this question, leaving fuller
treatment to a later date.
In both the 1914 and 1920 Manuscripts, Weber drew a clear distinction between Appropriation
and Dispositional Powers, on the one hand, and Domination (Herrschaft) on the other hand. 325 He
nevertheless repeatedly noted that these may be closely connected in concrete reality. In his manuscript
addressing the relationship of Domination and Legitimacy, Weber stated that “control (Verfügung) over
economic goods, i.e. economic power (Macht), is a frequent, often fully-intended consequence of
Domination, as well as one of its [Domination’s] most important means.” 326 Nevertheless, he went on to
state that, while the uneven distribution of economic power rooted in Appropriation may contribute to
Domination and result from Domination, such economic power should be analytically distinguished from
Domination. 327
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber defined Domination as “the probability that a command with a
given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.” 328 Domination is thus connected to
the giving of rules for action, and therefore to a hierarchically-structured Order in the sense described in
the Logos Essay. 329 Logically, it would seem that in any case where a closed social relationship has
resulted in an Order that is enforced by a person or persons in authority, i.e. in any case where an
“Organization” in Weber’s sense has emerged, 330 both Domination and Appropriation will be present, at
least to some extent.
This logical implication is borne out by Weber’s multiple discussions of Domination.

An

Organization can embrace everything from the patriarchal household (with the pater as owner and
authority) to the patrimonial “manor,” feudal “fiefs” and “benefices” – distinctive types of Domination
rooted in a Grundherr’s Appropriation and distribution of both land and authority – and on to modern
bureaucratic “states” and corporations, with their characteristic patterns of Appropriation and Domination.
325
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Thus, while ownership of another’s labor and person (i.e. slavery) may be the most intuitive area of
overlap between Appropriation and Domination, this overlap is bound to occur in a much wider variety of
cases, as Weber’s explications reveal. 331
Turning finally to Weber’s concepts of “class” and “status,” we see that he draws a direct
connection between these phenomena and property. Property is frequently discussed in the outline
concerning “Status Groups and Classes” in the 1920 Manuscripts, 332 and it is a dominant theme in the
“Class, Status, Party” essay of the 1914 Manuscripts. 333 Indeed, one of Weber’s three ideal types of class
is defined by the possession of valued goods and services: it is labeled a “possessory-class”
(Besitzklasse). 334
Weber’s “classes” are not communities, social relationships, or groups; rather, they are defined by
a shared “class situation.” 335 A shared class situation is a common set of conditions that is, in whole or at
least in part, determined by shared rights and privileges with respect to the use, possession or ownership
of property; this shared set of property-related conditions, in turn, produces a shared set of limitations on
the possibilities for social action. 336 “Possession and lack of possession (Besitzlosigkeit) are, therefore,
the basic categories of all class situations,” Weber bluntly stated. 337
Even status – a claim to social esteem based on education or inheritance – can rest on the
“monopolistic Appropriation” of opportunities for acquisition; ironically, however, status can also rest on
the abhorrence of such opportunities. 338 Status groups may arise out of shared possessory-classes. 339
More importantly, however, because it is a basis for communal identification, status can be a motivatingforce for the organized closure of a social relationship. 340 In such a case, status is a causal factor in the
emergence of property. The “goods and services” around which a status group might close ranks would
include such personal attributes as “honor” and “cultural prestige,” or certain privileged activities (e.g.
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wearing special clothes or performing an occupation). These are historical cases that Weber actually
describes. 341
While some may find the concept of property stretched too far by considering “honor” or
“prestige” in such terms, it is worth remembering that “rights” to honor and reputation still exist in
enforceable forms in contemporary society. Cases relating to defamation and libel, and to other personal
intangibles like privacy, are regularly countenanced in U.S. courts. And even if they aren’t treated
exactly like property, astute commentators have noted intriguing parallels to property. 342
Having now surveyed Weber’s sociological theory of property, and having briefly explored its
close connections to his theories of Domination and class, it is appropriate to conclude.
V. Conclusion
Max Weber died on June 14, 1920. “The earth had changed,” his wife Marianne wrote in the last
line of her husband’s biography. 343 And it is true that the political, social, and academic worlds have
dramatically changed in the 90 years since Max Weber’s death. The academic fields to which Weber
directed his attention (sociology, economics, law, political science, public administration, history, and
religious studies) are far more divided now than they were in his time. The German nation-state that
Weber so passionately defended has only recently begun to fully recover from the moral and political
depths to which it sank after his death. And technological innovations have wrought enormous changes
in communication and social interaction. In short, the social, economic, and political “life-worlds” of
today are vastly different from those that Weber experienced. 344
And yet, I hope to have persuaded the reader that Max Weber’s sociological theory of property
has much to offer to the sociology, law and economics of today. Richard Swedberg has drawn recent
attention to Weber’s “economic sociology of law.” 345

I wish to complement that project by drawing

attention to Weber’s sociological theory of property, a theory that is richly-informed by Weber’s
knowledge of law and his economic-historical research.
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In tracing the developments of Weber’s thought in relation to property, I hope to have contributed
to an “interpretive understanding” of his sociological theory of property. By the time of his death, that
theory was fully developed in a form that includes dynamic and structural elements, accounting for both
materiality and “ideality” in economy and society. I believe that Weber’s sociological theory of property
stands ready to be utilized in understanding and explaining contemporary developments in property,
particularly the phenomenon that may be the “great transformation” of our time: the emergence and
expansion of “intellectual property.”
Weber began his scholarly work with a definition of property that is strikingly similar to the
“bundle of rights” definitions so commonly used by contemporary law and economics scholars. 346
Passing through the phases described in this article as “legal” and “economic-historical,” and borrowing
richly from them, Weber completed his investigations of property in his sociological phase. By the end of
his life, he had articulated a sociological theory of property, one that “endogenizes” property as a social
phenomenon by explaining its social conditions and its social effects.
According to this theory, property’s social conditions are minimal and pervasive, while varying
enormously in their concrete manifestations and courses of development. These social conditions are (1)
the organized social closure of social relationships, which is (2) enabled by a valid Order. Property’s
social effects depend on a greater number of conditions, which again vary significantly in their concrete
manifestations. These conditions include: (1) the modes of enforcement and the inferred content of the
Order (the concepts, rules, and principles comprising the Order), (2) the organized structure(s) of social
relationship(s), (3) the number of co-existing organized social relationship and their modes of interaction,
(3) the nature of the goods and services appropriated, and (4) the modes according to which appropriated
goods and services are valued (household property or profit-earning capital).
Organized social closure is a necessary, social condition for the existence of property, according
to this theory. Preeminent historical examples of this Weberian organized social closure are corporations,
cities, guilds, and nation-states. In describing the distinctive social-relationship patterns characteristic of
these organizations, as well as their distinctive patterns of development, Weber laid a foundation for his
work in Economy and Society. That foundation began with his dissertation and ended with his lectures on
General Economic History. That Economy and Society is riddled with references to property-related
concepts is therefore no accident: from beginning to end, property rested at the heart of Weber’s scholarly
work in law, economic history, and sociology.
Weber viewed the economy as being “embedded” within society, in the sense that economic
action is influenced by the patterns of directedness in meaning (i.e. culture), the relationship-structures,
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and the material realities comprising the broader society within which that economic action takes place. 347
Occupying its position as part of the Formally-Correct Order – and thereby impacting the EmpiricallyValid Order – law influences patterns of directedness in meaning, social relationship structures, and their
courses of development through history. Property – which is, from this perspective, an indirect creature
of law, but which can exist in de facto forms without law (or in spite of it) as a result of organized social
closure oriented to an “as if” Order – connects meaning and structure to material reality. Valued objects,
most of which have come from the material world, are used, possessed, and/or “owned,” and this is
enabled by socio-relational structures and patterns of directedness in meaning. This use, possession or
ownership, in turn, both enables and is enabled by, patterns of power and hierarchy that emerge and
expand in socio-relational structures.
Economists and sociologists are reawakening to the importance of law. Jurists have sophisticated
theories of property, but these are not typically based in social science. As a jurist and socio-economic
theorist whose lifework continually returned to the theme of property, Weber stands poised to help answer
the need for a theory of property that can address that phenomenon in all of its dimensions: social,
economic-historical, and legal; structural, material, and symbolic.
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